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Abstract		In	this	project,	I	use	a	mediation	analysis	to	examine	how	the	partisanship	of	a	state	affects	how	the	state	implements	the	Affordable	Care	Act	(ACA),	and,	as	a	result,	constituents’	access	to	health	insurance.		I	construct	an	annual	panel	dataset	from	2010	to	2015.		Controlling	for	state	demographic	variables,	states	with	Democrat	governors	and	legislatures	are	more	likely	to	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	law	and	a	state-based	exchange.	States	that	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	experience	additional	pre	to	post-ACA	decreases	in	the	uninsured	rate	and	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	and	additional	increases	in	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	than	non-expansion	states.		Partisanship	does	not	have	a	direct	effect	on	pre	to	post-ACA	health	insurance	outcomes	changes;	any	effect	partisanship	has	strictly	comes	indirectly	through	its	effect	on	implementation	of	the	ACA.			 	
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I.	Introduction	Throughout	history,	there	has	been	a	great	deal	of	debate	about	how	much	economic	policies	differ	between	Republicans	and	Democrats.		On	one	hand,	Republicans	supposedly	tend	to	prefer	lower	tax	rates,	less	deficit	spending,	free	market	competition	with	little	government	regulation,	and	less	entitlement	spending	(Republican	National	Committee	2017).		On	the	other	hand,	Democrats	are	said	to	favor	more	government	regulation	in	the	economy,	progressive	taxation	(higher	tax	rates	for	higher	income	brackets),	universal	government	healthcare,	and	greater	entitlement	spending	(Democratic	National	Committee	2016).		Based	on	these	historical	trends,	my	motivating	question	for	this	project	is	how	much	does	economic	policy	actually	differ	when	Democrats	are	in	power	versus	when	Republicans	are?		Furthermore,	how	do	these	possible	differing	policies	affect	economic	outcomes?		 For	my	research,	I	choose	to	focus	on	healthcare,	which	is	one	of	the	most	expensive	sectors	of	the	economy.		In	2015,	the	federal	government	alone	spent	1.05	trillion	dollars	of	the	nation’s	3.8	trillion	dollar	federal	budget	(27.42	percent)	on	healthcare.		This	amount	was	second	only	to	spending	within	the	category	of	social	security,	unemployment,	and	labor	and	was	also	greater	than	federal	spending	on	the	next	three	largest	categories—military,	interest	on	debt,	and	veteran’s	benefits—combined	(National	Priorities	Project	2016).		Moreover,	adding	federal	spending	with	consumer	spending,	US	total	healthcare	spending	accounted	for	17.8	percent	of	the	nation’s	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	in	2015.		Total	healthcare	spending	was	equal	to	3.2	trillion	dollars,	which	is	an	average	of	approximately	
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9,990	dollars	per	person	(Centers	for	Medicare	&	Medicaid	Services	2016).		Within	the	healthcare	sector,	I	choose	to	examine	state-level	variation	in	the	Patient	Protection	and	Affordable	Care	Act	(ACA).		I	choose	the	ACA	because	although	it	is	a	federal	economic	policy,	states	have	control	over	how	they	choose	to	implement	it.		Each	state	can	decide	whether	or	not	it	wants	to	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	law	and	what	type	of	state	exchange	(federally-facilitated,	state-based,	or	partnership)	it	wants	to	operate.		The	specific	question	I	attempt	to	answer	is	how	does	the	executive	and	legislative	partisanship	of	a	state	affect	how	the	state	implements	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	state	exchange	components	of	the	law	and,	as	a	result,	constituents’	access	to	health	insurance?		 To	begin,	the	ACA	was	first	passed	and	signed	into	law	by	Barack	Obama	on	March	23,	2010.		The	primary	goal	of	the	law	is	to	decrease	the	number	of	US	citizens	who	are	uninsured.		The	first	way	in	which	the	law	addresses	this	goal	is	by	requiring	states	to	establish	and	operate	exchanges	where	individuals	and	small	businesses	can	purchase	health	insurance.		Although	the	federal	law	requires	that	states	set	up	these	exchanges,	it	gives	each	state	the	authority	to	choose	whether	it	wants	to	implement	a	federally-facilitated,	state-based,	or	partnership	exchange	(McAuliff	et	al.	2012).		All	three	types	of	exchanges	are	required	to	perform	the	four	core	functions	of	an	exchange,	which	include	overseeing	eligibility	and	enrollment,	plan	management,	consumer	assistance,	and	financial	management.		The	only	difference	between	each	type	is	which	functions	the	state’s	government	performs	and	which	the	federal	government	performs	(Noh	and	Krane	2016).		In	a	state-based	exchange,	the	state	is	responsible	for	performing	each	of	the	four	functions.		
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This	means	that	individual	consumers	and	small	business	employers	and	employees	enroll	in	coverage	through	marketplace	websites	that	are	established	and	run	by	the	state.		In	a	federally-facilitated	exchange,	the	US	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services	(HHS)	performs	all	four	core	functions.		As	a	result,	individual	consumers	and	small	businesses	and	their	employees	must	apply	for	and	enroll	in	coverage	through	the	federal	government’s	website,	healthcare.gov.		A	partnership	exchange	is	a	hybrid	of	the	state-based	and	federally-facilitated	exchanges,	with	the	state’s	government	performing	the	plan	management	and	consumer	assistance	functions	and	the	federal	government	performing	the	financial	management,	eligibility,	and	enrollment	functions.		Because	the	federal	government	performs	the	eligibility	and	enrollment	functions,	consumers	and	small	business	employers	and	their	employees	apply	for	and	enroll	in	coverage	through	healthcare.gov	(Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation	2017).		 The	ACA	also	stipulates	that	exchanges	must	offer	four	types	of	plans,	which	are	categorized	into	metal-tiers.		These	plans	are	offered	in	both	the	individual	and	small	business	markets.		The	main	difference	between	each	metal-tier	is	the	cost	sharing	of	the	total	plan	price	between	the	individual	and	his	or	her	insurance	company.		The	quality	of	care	is	consistent	across	all	plans,	as	they	each	provide	the	same	essential	health	benefits.		In	the	bronze	metal-tier,	the	insurance	company	covers	approximately	60	percent,	while	the	individual	pays	40	percent	of	the	total	healthcare	costs.		The	insurance	company	covers	approximately	70	percent	of	the	cost	for	a	silver-tier	plan,	80	percent	for	gold,	and	90	percent	for	platinum.		Bronze	plans	tend	to	have	a	low	monthly	premium	and	high	costs	when	individuals	need	
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care,	while	gold	and	platinum	plans	have	a	high	monthly	premium	and	low	costs	when	individuals	need	care.		Silver	plans	have	both	moderate	premiums	and	deductibles	(Healthcare.gov	2014).		Furthermore,	catastrophic	plans	are	also	available	to	certain	individuals.		Individuals	who	qualify	for	this	type	of	plan	are	those	who	are	under	the	age	of	thirty	or	those	of	any	age	who	qualify	for	a	hardship	or	affordability	exemption	from	the	individual	mandate	component	of	the	ACA.		Catastrophic	plans	are	only	available	to	individuals,	not	small	businesses.		Moreover,	they	provide	coverage	of	the	same	essential	health	benefits	that	the	metal-tier	plans	do	in	addition	to	covering	three	primary	care	visits	for	year	before	an	individual	has	met	his	or	her	deductible	(Healthcare.gov	2014).		 The	second	way	in	which	the	ACA	addresses	its	goal	of	reducing	the	uninsured	rate	is	through	a	Medicaid	expansion.		Medicaid	is	a	federal-state	health	insurance	program	that	covers	poor	individuals	of	all	ages	who	are	unable	to	afford	their	own	insurance.		It	also	covers	low-income	individuals	with	disabilities	(McAuliff	et	al.	2012).		Prior	to	the	ACA,	states	had	control	over	eligibility	for	and	levels	of	funding	put	towards	the	program.		When	the	ACA	was	first	passed	in	2010,	however,	it	required	that	all	states	expand	their	Medicaid	programs	to	provide	coverage	to	all	individuals,	including	children,	pregnant	women,	parents,	and	adults	without	dependent	children,	also	known	as	“childless	adults,”	who	are	under	the	age	of	65	and	have	incomes	up	to	138	percent	of	the	federal	poverty	line	(FPL).		Childless	adults	were	not	eligible	for	the	program	prior	to	its	expansion	under	the	ACA.		Moreover,	the	law	stated	that	if	a	state	did	not	expand	its	program,	it	would	lose	all	federal	Medicaid	funding	(McAuliff	et	al.	2012).		Many	states	found	it	unfair	
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that	the	federal	government	could	take	away	their	Medicaid	funding	if	they	did	not	expand	their	Medicaid	programs.		In	fact,	27	states	filed	or	were	part	of	lawsuits	that	challenged	this	component	of	the	law.		The	legal	challenge	eventually	reached	the	Supreme	Court	in	the	2012	case,	National	Federation	of	Independent	Business	v.	
Sebelius.		The	Supreme	Court	came	to	the	decision	that	the	federal	government	could	not	take	away	Medicaid	funding	from	states	that	did	not	want	to	expand	their	programs.		In	other	words,	the	Supreme	Court’s	decision	granted	states	the	ability	to	choose	whether	or	not	they	want	to	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	law	(Noh	and	Krane	2016).			 For	my	research,	I	examine	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	state	exchange	components	of	the	ACA	because,	as	mentioned	above,	they	are	the	two	primary	components	of	the	law	that	states	have	control	over	how	they	choose	to	implement.		Both	components	took	effect	on	January	1,	2014.		Two	other	components	of	the	ACA	that	are	essential,	but	states	do	not	have	control	over,	are	the	individual	mandate	and	premiums	and	cost-sharing	subsidized	by	tax	credits	to	help	low-income	persons	obtain	insurance.		The	individual	mandate	states	that	all	legal	residents	of	the	United	States	must	obtain	health	insurance.		If	a	person	does	not	obtain	insurance,	he	or	she	receives	a	tax	penalty	that	is	based	on	income.		The	tax	penalty	either	ranges	from	695	dollars	to	2085	dollars	per	year	(it	increases	as	income	increases)	or,	for	high-income	earners,	is	worth	2.5	percent	of	household	income	(Frean	Gruber,	and	Sommers	2016).		In	Medicaid	expansion	states,	premiums	and	cost-sharing	subsidized	by	tax	credits	are	available	to	individuals	who	both	fall	between	138	and	400	percent	of	the	FPL	and	purchase	their	insurance	through	the	
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state’s	federally-facilitated,	state-based,	or	partnership	exchange.		In	non-Medicaid	expansion	states,	premiums	and	cost-sharing	subsidized	by	tax	credits	are	available	to	citizens	who	both	fall	between	100	and	400	percent	of	the	FPL	and	purchase	their	insurance	through	the	state’s	exchange	(Noh	and	Krane	2016).		Tax	credit	values	are	based	on	the	second	lowest	cost	silver	plan	in	the	state	and	are	also	tied	to	income.		For	example,	the	tax	credit	is	2	percent	of	a	person’s	income	if	he	or	she	makes	up	to	138	percent	of	the	FPL	and	9.5	percent	if	he	or	she	makes	between	300	and	400	percent	(Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation	2013).		 I	begin	this	paper	with	a	summary	and	analysis	of	past	literature	on	differences	in	Republican	and	Democratic	economic	policy,	state-level	implementation	of	the	ACA,	and	post-ACA	health	insurance	outcomes.		I	then	use	a	mediation	analysis	that	allows	me	to	examine	my	central	question:	does	state	executive	and	legislative	partisanship	affect	health	insurance	outcomes?		Completing	a	mediation	analysis	allows	me	to	examine	how	ACA	Medicaid	expansion	and	exchange	implementation	choices	mediate	the	relationship	between	state	partisanship	and	health	insurance	outcomes.		Moreover	to	complete	this	mediation	analysis,	I	break	my	central	question	into	three	parts.	First,	does	state	executive	and	legislative	partisanship	affect	a	state’s	implementation	of	the	ACA?		Second,	does	implementation	of	the	exchange	and	Medicaid	expansion	components	of	the	law	affect	health	insurance	outcomes?		Third,	does	partisanship	have	an	additional	effect	on	changes	in	pre	and	post-2014	health	insurance	outcomes	beyond	its	influence	on	the	implementation	decisions,	which	then	affect	health	insurance	outcomes?		
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I	find	that	both	state	executive	and	legislative	partisanship	affect	how	a	state	implements	the	exchange	and	Medicaid	expansion	components	and	that	implementation	does	in	fact	affect	health	insurance	outcomes.		I	also	find	that	the	way	in	which	a	state	implements	the	two	components	of	the	law	has	a	significant	effect	on	the	changes	in	pre	to	post-ACA	health	insurance	outcomes.		Partisanship	also	affects	differences	in	pre	and	post-ACA	health	insurance	outcomes;	however,	this	effect	that	partisanship	has	only	comes	through	implementation	decisions.		In	other	words,	a	state’s	partisanship	affects	how	the	state	chooses	to	implement	each	of	the	two	components	of	the	ACA.		The	way	in	which	the	two	components	of	the	ACA	are	implemented	then	affects	health	insurance	outcomes.		Partisanship	does	not	have	an	additional	effect	on	health	insurance	outcomes	beyond	its	influence	on	the	implementation	decisions,	which	then	affect	health	insurance	outcomes.	
	
II.	Literature	Review	Throughout	this	section,	I	complete	an	in	depth	review	of	several	published	studies	that	relate	to	my	own.		These	papers	examine	a	variety	of	topics,	including	the	influence	of	political	parties	on	implementation	of	non-ACA	health	insurance	programs,	the	importance	of	political	parties	and	non-political	factors	in	ACA	implementation,	and	the	effect	of	ACA	implementation	on	health	insurance	outcomes.		Before	focusing	on	health	insurance	and	ACA-related	studies,	however,	I	begin	my	review	with	two	papers	that	look	at	how	economic	policies	and	outcomes	differ	under	Democrats	and	Republicans.									
 13 
In	his	article,	“Estimating	the	Impact	of	Gubernatorial	Partisanship	on	Policy	Settings	and	Economic	Outcomes:	A	Regression	Discontinuity	Approach,”	Leigh	(2008)	finds	that	there	are	few,	but	still	some	differences	in	both	economic	policy	and	outcomes	despite	whether	a	governor	is	Democrat	or	Republican.		For	his	research,	Leigh	(2008)	uses	panel	data	from	all	US	states	between	1941	and	2002.	He	drops	the	first	year	of	each	gubernatorial	term	from	his	dataset	because	policies	do	not	take	effect	immediately	and	often	do	not	have	an	impact	until	the	following	year	after	they	are	implemented.		Moreover,	he	completes	an	analysis	that	controls	for	state	and	year	fixed	effects	that	could	have	an	impact	on	the	policies	and	outcomes	he	is	examining.		In	this	analysis,	Leigh	(2008)	conducts	the	same	five	regressions	for	each	policy	or	outcome.		In	all	five	of	the	regressions,	his	dependent	variable	is	the	economic	policy	or	outcome.		The	three	policy	and	outcome	categories	he	examines	are	pure	policy	variables,	such	as	the	minimum	wage	or	tax	rates,	outcomes	that	are	a	result	of	both	policy	choices	and	economic	conditions,	such	as	expenditure	or	transfer	programs,	and	welfare	variables,	such	as	incomes	and	unemployment.		His	independent	variable	is	the	executive	partisanship	of	the	state.		This	variable	is	a	dummy	variable,	with	one	equaling	a	Democrat	governor	and	zero	equaling	an	Independent	or	Republican	governor.		Regressions	one	through	four	are	ordinary	least	squares	regressions.			In	the	first	regression,	Leigh	(2008)	simply	includes	his	dependent	variable,	independent	variable,	and	the	state	and	year	fixed	effects.		His	second	regression	is	the	first	regression	plus	a	variable	accounting	for	time-varying	characteristics	of	the	state.		Adding	this	variable	controls	for	the	fact	that	the	demographic	characteristics	
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of	the	state	could	have	an	effect	on	the	governor’s	policy	choices	or	economic	outcomes.		The	third	regression	is	the	second	regression	plus	two	measures	of	legislative	partisanship	that	control	for	any	partisan	affiliation	of	a	governor	that	may	be	correlated	with	the	partisan	composition	of	the	legislature.		Both	legislative	measures	are	dummy	variables,	with	the	first	equaling	one	if	Democrats	control	both	the	state’s	house	and	senate	in	a	given	year	and	the	second	equaling	one	if	Republicans	control	both	the	state’s	house	and	senate	in	a	given	year.		The	fourth	regression	is	the	third	regression	plus	the	Poole-Rosenthal	score	for	the	state’s	house	of	representatives.		The	Poole-Rosenthal	score	measures	the	ideology	of	the	state’s	house	of	representatives,	which	Leigh	(2008)	believes	is	a	reflection	of	the	ideology	of	the	state’s	voters	and,	therefore,	can	be	used	to	control	for	state	voter	ideology.		Finally,	the	fifth	regression	is	a	regression	discontinuity	estimation.		This	estimation	is	nearly	identical	to	the	fourth	regression;	however,	Leigh	(2008)	drops	states	that	had	non-contested	elections	from	his	dataset.		Non-contested	elections	are	defined	as	elections	in	which	one	party	won	80	percent	or	more	of	the	vote	or	elections	in	which	one	of	the	top	two	candidates	was	an	Independent.		This	allows	him	to	only	examine	states	that	had	similar	values	of	the	vote	share,	but	different	values	of	the	independent	variable,	executive	partisanship.		For	example,	a	state	could	have	a	voter	share	that	is	49	percent	to	51	percent	in	a	Republican’s	favor	or	in	a	Democrat’s	favor.		In	both	cases,	the	vote	share	is	nearly	the	same,	yet	executive	partisanship	is	completely	different.		Leigh	(2008)	finds	that	Democrat	governors	prefer	higher	minimum	wages.		Specifically,	the	minimum	wage	is	approximately	0.9	percent	higher	under	a	
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Democrat	governor	than	under	a	Republican	one.		This	result	was	significant	in	his	first	two	regressions.		He	also	finds	that	the	fraction	of	the	state	population	on	welfare	is	approximately	1	to	2	percent	higher	under	Democrat	governors,	with	this	result	being	significant	in	the	third	and	fourth	regressions.		Third,	he	finds	that	median	post-tax	incomes	are	precisely	1	percent	higher	and	post-tax	inequality	is	1/3	of	a	Gini	point	lower	under	Democrat	governors.		Both	of	these	results	are	significant	in	the	second,	third,	and	fourth	regressions.		Fourth,	using	the	regression	discontinuity	estimation,	he	finds	that	Democrats	generally	preside	over	lower	unemployment	rates,	approximately	0.2	to	0.3	percentage	points	lower	than	under	a	Republican	governor,	and	over	slightly	lower	state	revenues.		Finally,	Leigh	(2008)	concludes	that	tax	rates,	pre-tax	incomes	and	inequality,	and	spending	policies	do	not	significantly	differ	between	Republican	and	Democrat	governors.	Similar	to	Leigh	(2008),	in	his	paper	“Democrats,	Republicans,	and	Taxes:	Evidence	that	Political	Parties	Matter,”	Reed	(2006)	examines	the	influence	of	state	partisanship	on	economic	outcomes.		In	addition	to	legislative	partisanship,	Reed	(2006)	also	includes	executive	partisanship	as	an	independent	variable.		For	legislative	partisanship,	he	includes	variables	for	a	Democratic	legislature	and	a	Republican	legislature,	the	omitted	legislative	partisanship	variable	being	when	the	legislature	is	split.		For	executive	partisanship,	he	includes	a	variable	for	a	Democrat	governor,	the	omitted	categories	being	when	the	governor	is	Republican	or	Independent.		Furthermore,	instead	of	focusing	on	a	variety	of	economic	outcomes,	as	Leigh	(2008)	does,	Reed	(2006)	solely	uses	state	tax	burdens	as	his	dependent	variable.		State	tax	burdens	are	the	ratio	of	total	state	and	local	tax	revenues	to	state	
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personal	income.		Reed	(2006)	uses	a	change	in	the	state’s	tax	burden	as	an	indicator	of	a	political	party	influence	on	taxes.		The	data	used	in	the	model	is	state-level	data	from	1960	to	2000	for	the	included	45	states.		Alaska	and	Hawaii	are	dropped	from	the	dataset	because	they	are	not	part	of	the	Contiguous	United	States,	Nebraska	and	Minnesota	are	dropped	because	they	had	a	unicameral,	non-partisan,	legislature	for	some	or	all	of	the	time	period	being	examined,	and	Wyoming	is	dropped	because	there	were	data	collection	issues	in	the	composition	of	its	tax	burden	variable.		Finally,	the	unit	of	observation	that	Reed	(2006)	uses	is	state-5-year-period.		Because	Reed	(2006)	groups	his	data	into	five-year	periods,	the	Democrat	legislature	and	Republican	legislature	variables	are	defined	as	the	percentage	of	years	during	the	five	year	period	that	Democrats	or	Republicans,	respectively,	controlled	both	chambers	of	the	state	legislature.		The	Democrat	governor	variable	is	defined	as	the	percentage	of	years	during	the	five-year	period	that	the	state	had	a	Democrat	governor.		Because	economic	outcomes	are	often	reflections	of	policies	implemented	in	the	previous	year,	all	three	partisanship	variables	are	lagged	by	one	year.	Reed	(2006)	runs	four	primary	regressions;	the	first	two	are	ordinary	least	squares	and	the	other	two	are	two-stage	least	squares.		In	all	four	regressions,	he	controls	for	state	and	voter	characteristic	variables,	including	the	percentage	of	a	state’s	population	over	65,	the	percentage	of	the	state’s	population	who	are	African	American,	the	percentage	of	the	state’s	population	who	are	female,	the	percentage	of	the	state’s	citizens	who	are	at	least	twenty-five	and	have	completed	at	least	a	college	degree	program,	the	percentage	of	nonagricultural	wage	and	salary	employees	who	
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are	union	members,	the	percentage	of	a	state’s	personal	income	attributed	to	farm	and	manufacturing	sectors,	the	ratio	of	a	state’s	population	to	its	land	area,	and	the	Americans	for	Democratic	Action	variable,	which	controls	for	the	influence	of	voters’	policy	preferences	on	the	implementation	of	public	policy	by	the	state’s	federal	legislators.		These	variables	are	controlled	for	because	past	research	has	shown	that	populations	that	are	older,	more	educated,	and	more	agriculturally-based	tend	to	prefer	lower	taxes,	while	populations	that	are	more	urban,	unionized,	and	have	greater	percentages	of	African	Americans	and	females	prefer	higher	ones.		He	also	controls	for	the	initial	tax	burden	at	the	beginning	of	the	five-year	period	being	examined	and	each	regression	includes	state	and	time	fixed	effects.		He	includes	these	fixed	effects	because	state	tax	burdens	showed	cyclical	behavior	over	his	sample	period.		Similar	to	the	partisanship	variables,	all	control	variables	are	lagged	by	one	year.		In	one	of	the	ordinary	least	squares	regressions	and	one	of	the	two-stage	least	squares	regressions,	Reed	(2006)	also	controls	for	omitted	variable	bias	by	including	interactive	time	effects	for	the	following	state	and	voter	characteristic	variables:	percent	union,	population	density,	farm	share,	and	the	initial	tax	burden.		Reed	(2006)	chooses	this	combination	of	variables	because	using	these	specific	variables	in	his	regression	gives	him	the	best	regression	according	to	the	Akaike	Information	Criterion	score,	a	score	that	measures	the	relative	quality	of	several	specifications	for	a	given	dataset.		Finally,	Reed	(2006)	chooses	to	use	two-stage	least	squares	regressions	in	addition	to	the	ordinary	least	squares	regressions	to	address	the	potential	confound	of	endogenety,	which	means	that	an	independent	
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variable	could	be	correlated	with	the	dependent	variable’s	error	terms	in	the	specification.		Reed	(2006)	believes	that	the	variables	that	could	be	endogenous	in	his	regression	are:	percent	elderly,	percent	female,	percent	black,	percent	college-educated,	percent	union,	population	density,	log	of	real	per	capita	personal	income,	farm	share,	and	manufacturing	share.		In	the	two-stage	least	squares	regressions,	each	endogenous	variable’s	instrument	is	the	initial	value	the	variable	takes	at	the	beginning	of	the	5-year	subset	of	data	being	examined.		For	example,	if	Reed	(2006)	is	examining	the	time	period	of	1960	to	1965,	the	instrument	variable	for	percent	elderly	is	the	value	of	percent	elderly	in	1960.			All	four	regressions	lead	Reed	(2006)	to	conclude	that	political	parties	have	a	significant	impact	on	state	tax	policy.		State	tax	burdens	are	greater	under	Democrats.		Moreover,	the	two-stage	least	squares	regressions	indicate	an	even	larger	increase	in	state	tax	burdens	under	Democrats	and	a	greater	decrease	in	state	tax	burdens	under	Republicans	than	the	ordinary	least	squares	regressions	do.		Specifically,	the	two-stage	least	squares	regression	with	the	interactive	variables	yields	the	result	that	tax	burdens	are	approximately	0.315	to	0.542	percentage	points	higher	when	Democrats	control	the	state	legislature.		Finally,	he	finds	that	the	political	party	of	the	governor	has	little	effect	on	tax	burdens.		He	hypothesizes	that	this	is	the	case	because	each	state’s	governor	has	to	satisfy	the	policy	preferences	of	his	or	her	state’s	median	voter,	whereas	each	legislator	only	needs	to	satisfy	the	median	voter	in	his	or	her	respective	district,	which	could	be	more	polarized	than	the	entire	state	itself.			
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Focusing	more	specifically	on	health	insurance,	several	studies	looking	at	how	political	parties	influence	various	degrees	of	health	insurance	program	implementation	have	been	completed.		In	their	article,	“The	Social	Environment	and	Medicaid	Expenditures:	Factors	Influencing	the	level	of	State	Medicaid	Spending,”	Buchanan,	Cappelleri,	and	Ohsfeldt	(1991)	use	data	for	47	states	between	1977	and	1987	to	create	a	two-stage	least	squares	model.		Their	model	examines	how	a	variety	of	economic,	political,	and	administrative	factors	affect	state	Medicaid	expenditures	in	each	of	the	years	being	examined.		The	factors	examined	for	each	state	include	personal	income	per	capita	in	terms	of	real	1967	dollars,	a	liberal	index	used	to	measure	the	state’s	political	alignment,	an	index	used	to	measure	the	state’s	political	competition,	the	number	of	patients’	care	physicians	per	1000	persons,	the	percentage	of	Medicaid	expenditures	paid	for	by	the	federal	government,	the	previous	year’s	Medicaid	expenditures,	the	number	of	Medicaid	recipients,	and	a	variable	that	reflects	which	level	of	government	(state	or	local)	is	administering	the	Medicaid	program.		The	authors	hypothesize	that	states	with	higher	per	capita	incomes,	greater	political	competition,	a	greater	number	of	physicians	per	1000	persons,	higher	numbers	of	Medicaid	recipients,	and	higher	Medicaid	expenditures	in	the	previous	year	will	all	have	higher	Medicaid	expenditures	in	the	present	year.		They	also	predict	that	Medicaid	expenditures	will	be	higher	in	states	that	have	a	greater	percentage	of	their	Medicaid	expenditures	being	paid	by	the	federal	government	and	are	more	liberal.			One	issue	with	the	variables	being	used	in	the	model	is	that	one	of	the	independent	variables,	the	previous	year’s	Medicaid	expenditures,	is	the	same	
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variable	as	the	dependent	variable,	the	only	difference	being	that	it	is	lagged	by	one	year.		In	other	words,	the	independent	variable	is	Medicaid	expenditures	at	time	t-1	and	the	dependent	variable	is	Medicaid	expenditures	at	time	t.		The	authors	choose	to	use	a	two-stage	least	squares	model	because	it	can	address	this	issue.		In	the	first	stage,	the	authors	create	an	instrumental	variable	by	regressing	the	log	of	the	dependent	variable	(Medicaid	expenditures	at	time	t)	on	all	of	the	independent	variables.		In	the	second	stage	of	the	regression,	this	new	instrumental	variable,	which	is	the	predicted	value	of	log	expenditures	lagged	by	one	year,	is	used	instead	of	the	original	independent	variable	and	the	equation	is	re-estimated	using	ordinary	least	squares.			The	authors	find	that	economic	factors	have	the	greatest	influence	on	how	much	the	state	spends	on	Medicaid.		As	real	personal	income	per	capita	increases,	the	real	dollar	amount	of	the	current	year’s	Medicaid	expenditures	also	increases.		In	other	words,	wealthier	states	spend	more	on	Medicaid	than	poor	states	do.		Moreover,	as	the	real	dollar	amount	of	Medicaid	expenditures	for	the	previous	year	increases,	so	does	the	real	dollar	amount	of	Medicaid	expenditures	for	the	current	year.		Second,	the	authors	find	that	implementation	factors	have	the	second	greatest	influence.		States	who	administer	their	Medicaid	programs	through	local-level	governments	spend	more	on	the	program	than	those	that	administer	the	Medicaid	program	through	the	state-level	government.		Finally,	Buchanan,	Cappelleri,	and	Ohsfeldt	(1991)	find	that	there	is	not	a	relationship	between	the	liberal	ideology	index	and	Medicaid	spending,	meaning	that	more	liberal	states	are	not	necessarily	
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more	likely	to	spend	more	on	Medicaid.		They	find	the	same	type	of	results	for	the	relationship	between	interparty	competition	and	Medicaid	spending.	Similarly,	Daniel	Tope	and	Lisa	N.	Hickman	(2012)	look	at	which	factors	influence	how	a	state	implements,	and	how	much	a	state	spends	on	the	Children’s	Health	Insurance	Policy	(CHIP)	in	“The	Politics	of	Children’s	Health	Insurance	Policy.”		As	Tope	and	Hickman	(2012)	explain,	CHIP	was	passed	as	part	of	the	federal	Balanced	Budget	Act	of	1997.		It	mandated	that	states	create	medical	insurance	programs	to	cover	children	who	would	not	otherwise	be	able	to	receive	insurance.		Similar	to	the	ACA,	CHIP	is	a	federally	sponsored	program,	with	state	leaders	being	given	control	over	how	they	want	to	implement	it.		This	means	that	they	can	choose	how	much	they	want	to	spend,	what	children	qualify,	and	what	resources	are	allocated	towards	the	program.		Tope	and	Hickman	(2012)	hypothesize	that	political	factors,	fiscal	capacity,	bureaucratic	development,	prior	policy	spending,	and	race	composition	can	influence	how	the	state	implements	CHIP.		 To	examine	their	question,	the	authors	use	a	panel	data	set	with	data	from	1998	to	2008,	where	their	unit	of	analysis	is	one	of	48	states—they	exclude	Hawaii	and	Alaska—in	one	of	the	given	years.		They	run	their	analysis	using	two	regressions.		The	first	regression	they	run	is	a	simple	linear	regression	with	panel-correlated	standard	errors.		The	second	regression	is	an	ordinary	least	squares	with	random	effects.		They	primarily	use	this	second	regression	as	a	robustness	test.		To	measure	political	factors,	the	authors	use	a	dummy	variable	equaling	one	if	the	governor	of	the	state	is	a	Republican	and	zero	otherwise;	they	also	measure	the	
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percentage	of	Republicans	in	each	state	legislature.		To	measure	fiscal	capacity,	state	debt	is	divided	by	tax	revenue	for	each	year.		To	measure	bureaucratic	development,	the	authors	use	a	ten-point	scale	for	each	component	of	a	state’s	development	of	the	program:	compensation	level,	time	in	session,	and	staff	size.	To	measure	prior	policies,	a	policy	legacy	indicator	of	“best	case”	states	for	welfare	policy	development	is	used.		The	authors	use	the	percentage	of	African	Americans	and	Hispanics	in	each	state	to	measure	the	influence	of	the	state’s	racial	and	ethnic	composition.		Finally,	the	authors	control	for	several	variables,	including	the	ratio	of	the	number	of	uninsured	children	to	the	total	population,	the	ideological	leanings	of	state	populations,	and	the	median	age	of	the	state	population.		 Using	both	regressions,	which	produced	similar	results,	Tope	and	Hickman	(2012)	find	that	having	a	Republican	governor	and	legislature,	higher	African	American	population,	and	older	population	each	decrease	CHIP	spending.		On	the	other	hand,	they	find	that	professionalized	state	legislatures,	higher	financial	capacities,	and	prior	welfare	spending	each	increase	CHIP	spending.		Moreover,	they	conclude	that	state	legislatures	that	are	more	developed	or	bureaucratized	are	better	equipped	to	study	and	develop	policy,	therefore	increasing	CHIP	spending.		Finally,	they	find	that	the	more	uninsured	children	a	state	has,	the	more	likely	it	is	to	spend	on	CHIP.	Along	with	articles	that	study	how	political	parties	influence	general	health	insurance	policies,	there	have	also	been	several	studies	that	examine	how	political	parties	influence	ACA	implementation.		In	their	article	“The	Politics	of	Need:	Examining	Governors’	Decisions	to	Oppose	the	‘Obamacare’	Medicaid	Expansion,”	
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Barrilleaux	and	Rainey	(2014)	examine	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	ACA.		The	authors	hypothesize	that	political	ideology,	state	economic	conditions,	public	opinion	of	the	ACA,	and	the	needs	of	citizens	are	all	factors	in	determining	whether	a	governor	decides	to	enact	the	Medicaid	expansion	component.		To	test	their	hypothesis,	Barrilleaux	and	Rainey	(2014)	use	data	from	2012	to	2014	for	all	50	states	and	a	logistic	regression	model.		In	the	model,	the	independent	variables	for	each	state	are	the	partisanship	of	the	governor	(a	dummy	variable	where	a	Republican	governor	equals	one	is	used),	the	partisanship	of	the	legislature	(a	dummy	variable	that	equals	one	if	the	legislature	is	controlled	by	Republicans	is	used),	the	estimated	percentage	of	the	population	that	has	a	favorable	view	of	the	ACA,	the	percentage	of	the	state’s	population	that	is	uninsured,	and	Disproportionate	Share	Hospital	(DSH)	payments	to	hospitals.		DSH	payments	are	federally	required	payments	that	state	Medicaid	programs	make	to	hospitals	that	primarily	treat	either	individuals	who	are	uninsured	or	insured	through	Medicaid.		The	dependent	variable	is	the	state’s	executive	opposition	to	the	Medicare	expansion,	with	executive	opposition	equaling	one	if	the	governor	opposes	the	Medicaid	expansion.		Four	primary	state-level	control	variables	are	also	used	in	the	model,	including	the	percentage	of	African	Americans	and	the	percentage	of	the	population	living	in	a	metropolitan	area.		Barrilleaux	and	Rainey	(2014)	explain	that	both	of	these	controls	are	included	because	non-whites	and	people	living	in	cities	are	more	likely	to	enroll	in	Medicaid.		The	third	control	included	is	the	measure	of	the	state’s	fiscal	health,	and,	therefore,	ability	to	pay	for	Medicaid.		This	is	equal	to	the	ratio	of	the	state’s	year-end	reserves	to	their	total	spending.		The	final	control	is	
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the	state’s	current	Medicaid	multiplier,	which	is	used	to	measure	the	attractiveness	of	the	new	Medicaid	funds	that	would	come	from	implementing	the	Medicaid	expansion	relative	to	the	current	rate	of	funds	the	state	is	putting	towards	the	program.			The	authors	find	that	a	governor’s	partisanship	and	state	legislative	control	each	have	a	larger	effect	on	a	state’s	decision	to	oppose	the	Medicaid	expansion	than	the	effects	the	needs	of	citizens,	public	opinion,	or	state	economic	conditions	do.		Having	a	Republican	governor	increases	the	probability	of	executive	opposition	by	49	percentage	points,	and	having	a	Republican	legislature	in	a	state	with	a	Republican	governor	increases	the	chance	of	executive	opposition	by	36	percentage	points.		In	states	that	have	Democrat	legislatures,	having	a	Republican	governor	increases	the	chance	of	executive	opposition	by	approximately	9	percentage	points.		Public	opinion	of	the	ACA	and	measures	of	need,	including	urbanization,	DSH	payments	to	hospitals,	and	the	percentage	of	the	population	that	is	uninsured,	do	not	have	a	significant	effect	on	a	governor’s	decision	to	oppose	the	Medicaid	expansion.			In	a	similar	study	to	that	of	Barrilleaux	and	Rainey	(2014),	Rigby	(2012)	examines	whether	political	or	economic	factors	play	more	of	a	role	in	determining	the	degree	to	which	a	state	will	resist	the	ACA	in	her	article,	“State	Resistance	to	‘ObamaCare.’”		She	also	focuses	on	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	law.		To	begin,	Rigby	explains	that	there	are	three	ways	in	which	a	state	can	resist	implementing	the	law:	through	filing	a	lawsuit	that	challenges	it,	implementing	legislation	that	opposes	it,	or	rejecting	federal	implementation	funds.		Using	state-
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level	data	from	2010	and	2011,	she	constructs	a	state	resistance	index	that	gives	each	state	a	rating	from	zero	to	three,	depending	on	how	many	of	the	measures	the	state	took	to	resist	the	law.		Rigby	(2012)	then	uses	a	multivariate	logistic	regression	model	to	compare	the	reasons	for	state	resistance	to	the	Medicaid	expansion.		First,	she	uses	an	ordered	logit	regression	to	predict	how	several	predictors	affect	the	probability	of	each	level	of	resistance.		One	regression	is	run	for	each	predictor.		The	predictor	used	to	measure	public	opinion	is	the	percentage	of	the	public	opposed	to	the	expansion.	To	measure	party	control,	the	predictors	are	the	percentage	of	the	legislature	that	is	Republican	and	whether	or	not	the	governor	is	a	Republican.		Legislative	professionalism,	per	capita	income,	and	budgetary	shortfalls	are	each	predictors	used	to	measure	state	capacity.		Medicaid	enrollment	increases,	the	cost	of	a	Medicaid	increase,	reductions	in	the	percentage	of	people	uninsured,	and	uncompensated	care	savings	are	each	predictors	used	to	measure	the	magnitude	of	a	policy	change.		After	running	one	regression	for	each	individual	predictor,	she	then	runs	another	regression,	which	includes	all	ten	of	the	predictor	variables	together.			Similar	to	Barrilleaux	and	Rainey	(2014),	Rigby	(2012)	finds	that	the	most	influential	factor	in	determining	whether	a	state	resists	the	ACA	is	the	partisanship	of	the	state.		She	also	finds	that	both	the	state’s	legislative	and	executive	branches	are	influential	in	determining	whether	a	state	resists	the	ACA.		If	Republicans	control	at	least	one	of	the	two	branches,	then	the	state	is	more	likely	to	resist	the	ACA.	Finally,	she	finds	that	both	public	opinion	and	economic	factors	do	not	affect	a	state’s	resistance.	
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	 In	a	similar	project	completed	two	years	later,	Rigby	and	Haselswerdt	(2014)	instead	look	at	the	state	health	insurance	exchange	component	of	the	law	and	attempt	to	determine	whether	economic,	ideological,	or	partisan	factors	play	the	largest	role	in	determining	how	and	when	a	state	implements	a	state	health	insurance	exchange.		They	first	explain	that	there	are	three	steps	a	state	can	take	to	show	that	they	will	establish	a	state	exchange:	they	can	express	their	intentions	in	an	application	for	a	federal	exchange	establishment	grant,	declare	their	intent	to	establish,	or	submit	a	blueprint	to	the	federal	government	requesting	certification	of	a	state-based	or	a	partnership	exchange.		Using	data	on	each	state’s	progress	in	establishing	a	health	insurance	exchange	between	March	2011	and	December	2012,	the	authors	run	a	conditional	risk-set	duration	model.		This	model	helps	them	to	determine	the	likelihood	of	a	particular	state,	at	a	particular	time	point,	moving	to	a	higher	level	of	implementation	of	one	of	the	three	types	of	exchanges	(federally-facilitated,	state-based,	or	partnership),	which	is	signified	by	the	state	taking	one	of	the	aforementioned	three	steps.		This	model	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	if	a	state	takes	one	of	these	three	steps	to	establish	an	exchange,	then	the	state	supports	the	ACA.		Rigby	and	Haselswerdt	(2014)	find	that	ideological	and	partisan	factors	play	the	largest	role	in	determining	how	a	state	implements	the	exchange	component	of	the	law.		Moreover,	they	find	that	liberal	states,	meaning	those	with	a	Democrat	governor	and	Democrat	legislature,	will	generally	agree	with	the	policy	objectives	of	the	ACA	and	will	choose	to	implement	their	own	state-based	health	exchanges	instead	of	a	partnership	or	federally-facilitated	one.		On	the	other	hand,	
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conservative	states	will	avoid	implementation,	eventually	establishing	their	own	exchanges	to	maintain	policy	autonomy	and	avoid	the	consequence	of	having	the	federal	government	step	in	to	establish	a	federally-run	exchange.				 In	another	project	that	examines	the	state	exchange	component	of	the	law,	Jones,	Bradley,	and	Oberlander	(2013)	examine	the	decision-making	process	that	states	with	Republican	governors	went	through	when	deciding	whether	or	not	to	implement	an	exchange	during	the	time	when	the	exchange	component	of	the	law	was	under	debate	in	the	Supreme	Court	in	2012.		The	authors	determine	that	Republicans	face	a	dilemma	when	deciding	whether	or	not	to	implement	an	exchange	because	they	want	to	maintain	policy	autonomy,	which	would	be	accomplished	through	implementing	an	exchange,	but	they	do	not	want	to	give	into	a	law	they	oppose.		Jones,	Bradley,	and	Oberlander	(2013)	compare	this	dilemma	to	Pascal’s	Wager.			Pascal’s	Wager	is	an	idea	proposed	by	seventeenth-century	philosopher	Blaise	Pascal.		It	states	that	when	a	person	is	uncertain	as	to	whether	or	not	God	exists,	the	safest	way	to	live	is	by	assuming	that	God	is	real	and	that	he	will	judge	you	in	the	afterlife.		The	way	in	which	Republicans	dealt	with	dilemma	of	whether	or	not	to	implement	an	exchange	before	the	exchange	component	of	the	law	was	upheld	by	the	Supreme	Court	is	similar	to	Pascal’s	Wager	because	a	large	part	of	the	dilemma	was	based	on	whether	or	not	Republican	states	believed	the	exchange	component	of	the	law	would	survive.		Some	Republicans	took	the	same	approach	as	suggested	by	Pascal	in	his	Wager,	meaning	that	they	assumed	that	the	law	would	stand	and	its	deadlines	would	be	enforced,	just	as	Pascal	assumed	that	God	existed	
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and	would	judge	one	in	the	afterlife.		Others,	however,	decided	to	interpret	the	law	as	if	it	did	not	exist.		Instead	of	using	an	econometric	model,	as	seen	in	similar	projects,	Jones,	Bradley,	and	Oberlander	(2013)	solely	examine	Republican-governed	states.		In	each	state	they	examine,	they	conduct	interviews	between	June	2011	and	February	2013	with	state	policy	makers	and	leaders.		They	find	that	a	state’s	decision	to	implement	the	state-based	exchange	did	not	depend	on	which	political	party	was	governing	the	state,	as	Rigby	and	Haselswerdt	(2014)	found.		Instead,	they	find	that	a	state’s	decision	depended	on	whether	it	thought	the	Supreme	Court	would	uphold	the	law,	what	the	outcome	of	the	November	2012	elections	would	be,	and	whether	or	not	it	wanted	to	retain	policy	autonomy.	In	their	article	“Why	States	Expand	Medicaid:	Party,	Resources,	and	History,”	Jacobs	and	Callaghan	(2013)	look	for	factors,	beyond	state	party	control,	that	influence	whether	or	not	a	state	implements	the	Medicaid	expansion.		They	recognize	that	political	party	control	does	in	fact	play	a	role	in	determining	whether	or	not	a	state	implements	the	Medicaid	expansion;	however,	they	also	emphasize	that	although	Democrat-controlled	states	are	more	likely	to	embrace	reform,	there	several	Republican	states	have	also	implemented	or	taken	steps	to	implement	the	reform.		For	this	reason,	Jacobs	and	Callaghan	(2013)	hypothesize	that	factors	such	as	state	economic	conditions,	decision-making	processes	and	outcomes	toward	previous	policies	similar	to	Medicaid,	and	what	states	can	do	administratively	may	also	influence	the	decision.		
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	 Jacobs	and	Callaghan	(2013)	measure	Medicaid	expansion	implementation	in	three	ways.		Their	first	form	of	measurement	is	gubernatorial	statements,	budgets,	or	collective	decisions	of	the	governor	indicating	a	Medicaid	expansion.		A	state	is	given	3	points	if	it	expanded,		-3	if	it	did	not,	and	0	if	it	failed	to	act.		The	second	measurement	looks	at	state	planning	steps.		For	this	measurement,	the	authors	tracked	receipts	of	federal	grants	to	the	state.		If	a	state	received	federal	support,	it	meant	the	state	was	seriously	considering	expanding.		The	authors	measure	Medicaid	expansion	by	examining	changes	in	Medicaid	policy	that	each	state	took	in	2013.		These	changes	included	the	expansion	of	benefits,	changes	in	the	application	and	renewal	process,	and	decreases	in	co-payments.		State	economic	conditions	were	measured	using	per	capita	state	income.		To	measure	the	past	policy	decisions,	the	authors	tracked	whether,	and	to	what	degree,	past	decisions	expanded	healthcare	to	pregnant	women,	working	parents,	the	medically	needy,	childless	adults,	and	more	than	90	percent	of	children.		Finally,	administrative	capacity	included	looking	at	how	well	the	state	determined	eligibility	for	its	citizens,	how	quickly	it	processed	enrollments,	how	strict	it	was	in	confirming	ensured	payments	were	made,	and	how	well	the	it	monitored	the	quality	of	care	it	provided	through	Medicaid.	Using	an	OLS	regression,	the	authors	find	that	the	states	with	the	highest	per	capita	income	are	moving	towards	Medicaid	expansion	implementation,	while	those	with	the	lowest	are	not.		Furthermore,	they	find	that	state	decisions	to	move	ahead	with	implementation	are	well	correlated	with	past	policy	decisions	to	increase	healthcare	access.		Finally,	they	find	that	states	that	have	stronger	administrative	
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structures	are	further	along	in	the	implementation	process	than	those	with	weaker	ones.				In	addition	to	these	studies	regarding	how	ACA	implementation	differs	under	Republicans	and	Democrats,	a	limited	number	of	studies	have	also	been	completed	on	how	ACA	implementation	affects	health	insurance	outcomes.		In	their	article	“Implementing	the	Affordable	Care	Act	Health	Insurance	Exchanges:	State	Government	Choices	and	Policy	Outcomes,”	Noh	and	Krane	(2016)	examine	whether	the	type	of	exchange	that	a	state	implements	affects	citizens	decisions’	to	enroll	in	the	exchange	and	whether	health	insurance	premiums	vary	depending	on	which	level	of	government	(federal,	state,	or	a	combination	of	both)	administers	the	exchange.		Instead	of	coding	exchanges	as	federally-facilitated,	state-based,	or	partnership,	Noh	and	Krane	(2016)	code	them	based	on	which	of	the	four	core	functions	of	an	exchange	(eligibility	and	enrollment,	plan	management,	consumer	assistance,	and	financial	management)	the	state	had	implemented	at	the	time	of	the	research.		The	more	core	functions	a	state	chooses	to	implement,	the	more	the	state-based	the	exchange	is.		The	authors	use	several	dummy	variables	to	measure	state	involvement	in	exchanges.		For	one	dummy	variable,	any	states	implementing	all	four	core	exchanges	are	coded	as	one	and	the	states	implementing	anything	less	are	coded	as	zero.		For	another	dummy	variable,	states	implementing	the	plan	management	and	consumer	assistance	functions	are	coded	as	one	and	any	other	combination	of	the	functions	are	coded	as	zero.		Finally,	a	third	dummy	variable	defines	one	as	equaling	states	that	implement	only	the	plan	management	function	and	zero	otherwise.			
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To	measure	citizen	enrollment	in	exchanges,	the	authors	look	at	the	percentage	of	eligible	individuals	who	obtained	insurance	through	the	exchanges	in	the	2014	and	2015	enrollment	periods,	which	is	calculated	using	the	proportion	of	the	number	of	enrolled	persons	in	the	exchanges	divided	by	the	number	of	eligible	individuals	who	could	potentially	obtain	coverage	through	the	exchanges.		Noh	and	Krane	(2016)	also	measure	state	involvement	based	on	whether	or	not	a	state	implements	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	ACA;	however,	they	do	not	measure	this	decision	with	a	simple	yes	or	no	answer.		Instead,	they	measure	the	Medicaid	expansion	using	the	percent	of	uninsured	persons	eligible	for	tax	credits	in	each	state.		In	states	that	have	not	implemented	the	Medicaid	expansion,	tax	credits	are	available	to	citizens	who	fall	between	100	and	400	percent	of	the	federal	poverty	level	(FPL)	and	also	purchase	their	insurance	through	the	exchange	the	state	has	chosen	to	implement.		If	the	state	has	implemented	the	Medicaid	expansion,	tax	credits	are	only	available	to	citizens	who	fall	between	138	and	400	percent	of	the	FPL	and	also	purchase	their	insurance	through	the	state’s	exchange.		Citizens	with	an	income	between	100	and	138	percent	of	the	FPL	are	covered	by	Medicaid	under	the	expansion,	and,	therefore,	are	not	covered	through	exchange	plans	that	are	subsidized	by	tax	credits.		Because	of	these	policies,	if	a	state	has	not	enacted	the	expansion,	there	will	likely	be	more	individuals	who	are	eligible	for	tax	credits.				Finally,	the	authors	measure	premium	prices	as	the	monthly	silver	and	bronze	premiums	for	a	40-year-old	non-smoker	making	$30,000	per	year	before	tax	credits	in	2014	and	2015	enrollment	periods.			
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Noh	and	Krane	(2016)	use	an	ordinary	least	squares	regression	model	with	state	exchange	and	Medicaid	implementation	as	their	independent	variables,	and	premiums	and	citizen	enrollment	as	the	dependent	variables.		They	find	that	states	that	implemented	all	four	core	functions	of	an	exchange	enrolled	a	higher	percent	of	eligible	individuals	than	states	that	did	not	implement	any	of	the	core	functions.		They	found	this	conclusion	to	be	the	case	in	2014,	while	there	was	no	difference	between	states	that	implemented	all	four	core	functions	and	those	that	do	not	in	2015.		The	authors	attribute	the	2015	results	to	the	fact	that	states	likely	promoted	their	exchanges	when	they	were	first	implemented	in	2014,	but	then	did	not	do	so	as	much	in	2015	once	the	exchanges	had	been	in	place	for	a	year.		Next,	they	find	that	implementation	of	both	the	financial	management	and	eligibility	and	enrollment	core	functions	influenced	premium	levels,	but	implementing	any	other	combination	of	functions	did	not.		Finally,	they	conclude	that	the	percentage	of	individuals	eligible	for	tax	credits	in	2014	and	2015	was	positively	associated	with	increased	enrollment;	this	relationship	was	statistically	significant.		This	result	shows	that	state	officials’	decisions	on	whether	or	not	to	expand	Medicaid	affect	the	number	of	individuals	eligible	for	tax	credits,	which	further	influences	whether	citizens	purchase	insurance	through	the	exchanges.				In	their	working	paper	“Impacts	of	the	Affordable	Care	Act	on	Health	Insurance	Coverage	In	Medicaid	Expansion	and	Non-Expansion	States,”	Courtemanche	et	al.	(2016),	also	examine	the	ACA’s	effect	on	insurance	outcomes;	however,	unlike	Noh	and	Krane	(2016),	they	focus	on	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	law.		They	ask	whether	implementing	the	Medicaid	expansion	has	
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an	effect	on	state	insurance	rates.		To	investigate	this,	they	use	a	difference-in-difference-in-differences	model	to	determine	the	effects	of	the	ACA	with	and	without	implementation	of	the	Medicaid	expansion	during	2014,	the	first	year	it	could	be	enacted.		In	this	type	of	model,	the	authors	first	look	at	states	that	implemented	the	Medicaid	expansion	in	2014.		Within	these	states,	they	look	at	the	change	between	pre-2014	and	post-2014	rates	in	high	uninsured	areas	versus	in	low	uninsured	areas.		Courtemanche	et	al.	(2016)	then	examine	non-Medicaid	expansion	states,	and	again	look	at	the	difference	between	the	pre	and	post	expansion	year	rates	in	high	uninsured	areas	versus	in	low	uninsured	areas.		Finally,	the	authors	compare	the	differences	between	these	two	groups	of	states.		In	the	model,	the	authors	control	for	several	state-level	variables	including	demographic	characteristics,	such	as	age,	gender,	and	race,	family	structure,	which	includes	marital	status	and	the	number	of	children	in	a	household,	and	economic	characteristics,	such	as	education,	household	income,	and	unemployment	rates.		They	also	include	an	interaction	variable	of	the	post-treatment	dummy	with	an	indicator	of	whether	a	state	set	up	a	state-based	exchange.		Including	this	interactive	variable	controls	for	the	fact	that	the	decision	to	expand	Medicaid	might	be	correlated	with	other	decisions	that	the	state	makes	in	regards	to	implementing	the	ACA.				Using	data	from	the	2014	American	Community	Survey	and	the	Kaiser	Family	Foundation,	the	authors	find	that	implementing	the	Medicaid	expansion	increased	the	insurance	rate	by	2.9	percentage	points	on	its	own.		Implementing	the	full	ACA	increased	the	proportion	of	residents	with	health	insurance	by	5.9	
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percentage	points.		If	a	state	did	not	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion,	the	insurance	rate	only	increased	by	3.0	percentage	points.		After	running	their	main	difference-in-difference-in-differences	regression,	Courtemanche	et	al.	(2016)	run	several	other	regressions	as	robustness	checks,	which	further	confirm	their	results.						 In	their	working	paper	“Premium	Subsidies,	the	Mandate,	and	Medicaid	Expansion:	Coverage	Effects	of	the	Affordable	Care	Act,”	Frean,	Gruber,	and	Sommers	(2016)	examine	how	a	variety	of	ACA	policy	provisions	have	each	affected	insurance	coverage	rates.		Similar	to	Courtemanche	et	al.	(2016),	the	authors	use	data	from	the	American	Community	Survey	and	a	difference-in-difference-in-differences	estimation.		Using	this	type	of	model	allows	the	authors	to	examine	the	effect	of	differences	in	the	policy	variables	on	changes	in	insurance	rates	over	time.		Their	model	also	includes	area	(in	terms	of	public	use	microdata	area	(PUMA)),	year,	and	income	fixed	effects,	which	allows	them	to	utilize	the	fact	that	individuals	are	associated	with	different	policy	variables	because	of	their	incomes	and	where	they	live.		The	four	primary	policy	provisions	the	authors	examine	are	new	Medicaid	eligibility	after	ACA	implementation,	premium	subsidy	rates,	the	individual	mandate	penalty,	and	pre-ACA	and	early	expansion	eligibility.		New	Medicaid	eligibility	after	ACA	implementation	is	simply	a	measure	of	the	proportion	of	people	that	gained	Medicaid	eligibility	after	the	ACA	was	implemented.		Premium	subsidy	rate	is	equal	to	one	minus	the	percent	subsidy	(Net	premium/unsubsidized	premium)	for	each	health	insurance	unit	(HIU).		An	HIU	is	defined	as	an	adult,	his	or	her	spouse,	and	their	dependent	children	living	in	a	household.		The	unsubsidized	premium	is	calculated	based	on	the	area	the	family	resides	in	and	is	equal	to	the	sum	of	
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individual	premiums	for	each	HIU	member.		Next,	the	individual	mandate	penalty	is	equal	to	each	family’s	tax	penalty	in	dollars	due	to	the	mandate.		Finally,	pre-ACA	and	early	expansion	eligibility	are	defined	as	Medicaid	eligibility	before	the	ACA	was	enacted	and	eligibility	under	pre-ACA	expansions	that	occurred	between	2011	and	2013	in	some	states,	respectively.		The	dataset	includes	data	from	2012	to	2015,	which	allows	the	authors	to	look	at	two	years	before	and	after	ACA	implementation.		The	authors	estimate	one	model	where	they	include	all	of	the	independent	policy	variables	for	the	years	2014	and	2015.		In	other	words,	there	are	eight	policy	variables	in	the	regression.		Furthermore,	the	authors	are	able	to	measure	the	direct	effects	of	each	policy	variable	in	all	four	years	of	the	study	by	interacting	each	of	them	with	post-ACA	year	fixed	effects.		Each	policy	variable	is	interacted	with	the	year	2014	and	then	again	with	the	year	2015.		The	dependent	variable,	the	uninsured	rate,	is	measured	as	the	percent	of	each	HIU	without	insurance	at	the	time	when	the	data	was	collected.	Demographic	variables,	such	as	age,	race,	marital	status,	citizenship,	educational	attainment,	number	of	children,	and	disability	are	also	controlled	for.		The	authors	run	this	regression	for	both	Medicaid	expansion	and	non-expansion	states,	allowing	them	to	compare	the	difference	in	Medicaid	eligibility	rates	in	high	and	low	Medicaid	eligibility	PUMAs	for	pre	and	post-2014	ACA	implementation	in	both	expansion	and	non-expansion	states.						The	authors	conclude	that	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	law	has	the	largest	impact	on	increasing	insurance	coverage	rates.		They	find	that	the	ACA’s	new	premium	subsidies	caused	a	0.85	percentage	point	increase	in	coverage	rates,	
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and	that	individual	mandate	tax	penalties	did	not	have	a	significant	effect.		The	Medicaid	expansion,	however,	caused	a	1.0	percentage	point	increase	in	coverage,	with	0.44	percentage	points	of	the	increase	being	attributed	to	newly	eligible	individuals	joining	the	program.		In	other	words,	insurance	coverage	increased	more	in	states	that	enacted	the	Medicaid	expansion	than	in	those	that	did	not.				 In	their	article	“Mortality	and	Access	to	Care	Among	Adults	After	State	Medicaid	Expansions,”	Sommers,	Baicker,	and	Epstein	(2012)	not	only	examine	how	implementing	a	pre-ACA	Medicaid	expansion	affected	health	insurance	outcomes,	but	also	health	outcomes	in	three	states:	New	York,	Maine,	and	Arizona.		The	authors	choose	these	states	because	they	all	significantly	expanded	Medicaid	eligibility	between	2000	and	2005.		Before	the	ACA,	Medicaid	typically	covered	low-income	children,	parents,	disabled	persons,	and	pregnant	women.		Each	of	these	states	also	expanded	Medicaid	to	cover	“childless	adults,”	which,	again,	are	non-disabled	adults	without	dependent	children.		In	each	of	these	states,	the	authors	observe	adults	between	the	ages	of	20	and	64	five	years	before	and	after	the	Medicaid	expansions.		Data	comes	from	the	Compressed	Mortality	file	of	the	CDC	and	the	Behavioral	Risk	Factor	Surveillance	system	for	the	years	1997	to	2007.			The	authors	use	a	difference-in-differences	regression	with	multiple	variables.	The	independent	variable	is	the	interaction	between	timing	after	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	expansion	state.		Using	an	interaction	variable	and	difference-in-differences	model	allows	them	to	compare	the	average	difference	in	the	dependent	variables	five	years	before	and	after	the	Medicaid	expansion	was	enacted	in	each	state.		For	the	dependent	variable,	the	authors	use	individual-level	
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uninsured	rates,	rates	of	delayed	care	because	of	health	insurance	costs,	and	self-reported	health	statuses.		As	a	control,	Sommers,	Baicker,	and	Epstein	(2012)	run	the	same	regression	for	three	other	states,	which	are	non-pre-ACA	Medicaid	expansion	states	with	similar	population	sizes	and	demographics	to	the	actual	Medicaid-expansion	states	being	examined.		New	York	was	compared	with	Pennsylvania,	Maine	with	New	Hampshire,	and	Arizona	with	Nevada	and	New	Mexico.		The	authors	compare	the	change	in	the	dependent	variables	in	each	of	these	control	states	from	before	to	after	the	year	in	which	the	Medicaid	expansion	was	enacted	in	the	non-control	state	they	are	being	compared	to.		Sommers,	Baicker,	and	Epstein	(2012)	then	compare	the	results	of	these	control	regressions	to	the	results	of	the	regressions	that	use	the	Medicaid-expansion	states.		The	authors	find	that	expanding	Medicaid	decreases	all-cause	mortality,	especially	for	older	adults,	non-whites,	and	residents	of	poorer	counties	within	the	states.		Moreover,	they	find	that	Medicaid	expansions	increase	Medicaid	coverage	by	2.2	percentage	points,	decrease	uninsured	rates	by	3.2	percentage	points,	decrease	rates	of	delayed	care	because	of	costs	by	2.9	percentage	points,	and	increase	self-reported	health	status	of	excellent	or	very	good	by	2.2	percentage	points.		Finally,	the	authors	explain	that	the	overall	uninsured	rate	might	have	decreased	by	more	than	the	Medicaid	coverage	rate	increased	because	of	spillover	effects	and	the	timing	of	the	Medicaid	expansion.		On	one	hand,	publicity	about	the	Medicaid	expansion	might	have	encouraged	uninsured,	higher-income	elderly	persons	to	seek	insurance	from	other	sources,	for	example,	Medicare.		On	the	other	hand,	they	hypothesize	that	the	states	examined	chose	to	expand	Medicaid	when	their	
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economies	were	booming;	economic	prosperity	can	greatly	improve	both	coverage	and	the	number	of	people	who	decide	they	want	to	obtain	insurance.		In	conclusion,	some	general	trends	can	be	drawn	from	the	research	presented	in	this	section.		First,	economic	policy	does	tend	to	slightly	differ	depending	on	which	political	party	is	in	power.		Second,	state	partisanship	typically	affects	how	a	state	implements	not	only	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	exchange	components	of	the	ACA,	but	also	healthcare	policy	in	general.		Finally,	the	way	in	which	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	exchange	components	of	the	ACA	are	implemented	often	affects	health	insurance	outcomes.		Although	all	of	the	studies	I	have	reviewed	in	this	section	examine	one	of	these	topics,	none	of	them	link	the	topics	together	and	examine	my	central	question,	how	does	state	executive	and	legislative	partisanship	affect	health	insurance	outcomes?		In	this	sense,	the	research	I	present	in	the	following	sections	is	both	unique	and	slightly	different	from	research	that	has	been	completed	in	the	past.			
III.	Data	For	all	of	my	regressions,	I	use	a	panel	dataset	that	I	have	constructed.		This	dataset	includes	data	from	2010	to	2015	for	all	fifty	states.		I	choose	to	use	data	from	2010	to	2015	so	that	I	can	examine	each	state	before	and	after	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	state	exchange	components	of	the	ACA	were	implemented	in	2014.		Furthermore,	using	a	panel	dataset	allows	me	to	look	at	each	state’s	individual	characteristics	in	annual	intervals	from	2010	to	2015.		To	begin,	for	each	state,	I	have	data	on	executive	and	legislative	partisanship.		Executive	partisanship	is	
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simply	whether	the	governor	is	a	Democrat,	Republican,	or	Independent.		For	legislative	partisanship,	the	data	includes	whether	the	entire	legislature	is	Democrat,	Republican,	or	split.		A	split	legislature	means	either	that	a	different	party	controls	each	chamber	(house	and	senate),	or	one	or	both	of	the	chambers	themselves	are	split	with	exactly	half	of	the	seats	held	by	Democrats	and	half	held	Republicans.		It	is	important	to	note	that	in	any	regression	that	uses	legislative	partisanship	as	one	of	its	variables,	Nebraska	is	dropped	from	the	dataset	because	its	legislature	is	non-partisan.	Executive	partisanship	data	comes	from	the	National	Governors	Association,	which	provides	information	on	each	state’s	past	and	present	governors,	the	length	of	their	time	in	office,	and	the	party	they	affiliate	with.		The	source	of	the	legislative	partisanship	data	is	the	National	Conference	of	State	Legislatures	(NCSL).		For	each	year	between	2009	and	the	present,	the	NCSL	offers	data	on	overall	state	legislative	control,	along	with	data	on	state	senate	and	house	control.		In	addition	to	presenting	data	on	which	party	controls	a	state’s	overall	legislature,	senate,	and	house,	the	NCSL	also	offers	information	on	the	total	number	of	state	legislature	seats,	which	is	further	broken	down	into	the	total	number	of	senate	and	total	number	of	house	seats.		 Next,	my	dataset	includes	data	on	how	each	state	implemented	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	state	exchange	components	of	the	ACA.		Because	these	components	of	the	law	were	only	enacted	in	2014,	my	implementation	data	only	includes	the	years	2014	and	2015.		For	each	state,	I	have	data	on	whether	or	not	it	enacted	the	Medicaid	expansion	(yes	or	no)	in	2014	or	decided	to	enact	it	in	2015.		This	data	
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comes	from	“Obamacare	Facts,”	a	website	that	provides	information	on	the	progress	each	state	has	made	in	implementing	the	ACA,	including	whether	or	not	it	implemented	the	Medicaid	expansion	and,	if	so,	what	year	it	was	implemented	in.	The	“Obamacare	Facts”	website	is	published	privately	by	an	independent	small	business	called	(dog)	Media	Solutions.		The	head	author	of	(dog)	Media	Solutions,	and	therefore	head	author	of	“Obamacare	Facts,”	is	Tom	DeMichele.		“Obamacare	Facts”	retrieves	their	data	from	healthcare.gov.		For	the	state	exchange	component	of	the	law,	the	dataset	includes	data	on	the	type	of	exchange	each	state	implemented	(federally-facilitated,	state-based,	or	partnership).		This	data	is	from	the	Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation,	a	foundation	that	collects	and	provides	data	on	anything	related	to	national	health	issues,	including	ACA	implementation,	health	insurance	prices,	and	health	outcomes.		Their	data	on	state	exchanges	includes	annual	state-level	information	on	what	type	of	exchange	the	state	enacted.	My	dataset	also	includes	a	variety	of	health	insurance	outcomes	for	each	state.		Four	of	these	outcomes	are	the	proportion	of	the	population	that	is	uninsured,	the	proportion	of	the	population	covered	by	Medicaid,	the	proportion	of	the	population	covered	through	an	employer,	and	the	proportion	of	the	population	covered	through	a	direct	purchase	(after	2014,	this	would	be	a	direct	purchase	made	through	the	state’s	exchange).		All	four	of	these	outcomes	are	from	the	US	Census	Bureau	1-year	American	Community	Surveys.		Each	year,	the	US	Census	Bureau	puts	out	a	survey	on	a	variety	of	topics,	including	healthcare.		When	a	person	fills	out	the	survey,	they	are	asked	to	indicate	how	they	get	their	health	insurance,	for	example,	if	they	are	covered	through	Medicaid,	an	employer,	or	a	direct	
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purchase.		The	US	Census	Bureau	then	breaks	down	this	information	by	year	and	state	and	puts	it	into	a	chart,	which	is	where	the	data	I	use	comes	from.		In	this	chart,	the	US	Census	Bureau	also	includes	each	state’s	uninsured	rate,	which	is	the	ratio	of	the	number	uninsured	people	over	the	age	of	19	to	the	total	number	of	people	over	the	age	of	19.			Besides	examining	how	people	are	covered	and	the	uninsured	rate,	my	health	insurance	outcomes	data	also	includes	a	variety	of	state-level	premium	prices.		One	of	these	premium	prices	is	the	average	monthly	family	premium	per	enrolled	employee	for	employer-based	health	insurance.		This	data	is	from	the	Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation.		Unfortunately,	it	was	only	available	from	2013	to	2015,	but	is	nonetheless	still	useful	because	the	time	frame	includes	pre	and	post-ACA	implementation	years.		The	other	two	types	of	premium	price	data	I	include	are	the	monthly	silver	and	bronze	premiums	for	a	40	year-old	non-smoker	making	$30,000	per	year	before	tax	credits.		Since	these	metal-tier	plans	were	introduced	with	the	state-exchange	component	of	the	ACA,	data	for	these	two	outcomes	is	only	from	2014	and	2015.		The	annual	data	is	from	the	Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation.		 Finally,	my	dataset	includes	several	control	variables.		Each	of	these	variables	are	used	to	control	for	factors	other	than	partisanship	that	could	affect	ACA	implementation	and	also	factors	other	than	ACA	implementation	that	could	affect	health	insurance	outcomes.		The	first	two	controls	are	the	proportion	of	the	population	below	the	poverty	level	and	the	median	household	income.		Both	variables	are	measures	of	state	population	income	and	are	included	as	controls	for	
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two	primary	reasons.		First,	Medicaid	is	a	program	that	provides	insurance	to	the	poor.		The	greater	the	number	of	poor	people	living	in	a	state,	meaning	the	greater	the	proportion	of	people	below	the	poverty	level	and	the	lower	the	median	household	income,	the	more	likely	the	state	is	to	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	because	implementing	the	expansion	allows	it	to	more	easily	provide	insurance	to	such	people.		Second,	both	variables	can	also	affect	the	uninsured	rate.		As	the	proportion	of	poor	people	living	in	a	state	increases	or	the	median	household	income	decreases,	the	uninsured	rate	might	also	increase	because	poor	people	will	have	a	harder	time	paying	for	insurance.			 	The	proportion	of	people	living	below	the	poverty	level	data	comes	from	the	US	Census	Bureau’s	annual	report	(2011,	2013,	2015)	on	poverty.		It	was	originally	collected	through	the	1-year	American	Community	Surveys	before	being	published	by	the	US	Census	Bureau.		In	the	report,	the	data	is	organized	in	a	table	that	gives	the	poverty	rate	for	each	state	for	the	current	year	of	the	report	and	the	previous	year.		Because	each	annual	report	includes	data	for	the	current	and	previous	year,	I	only	use	the	2015	(for	2014	and	2015	data),	2013	(for	2012	and	2013	data),	and	2011	(for	2010	and	2011	data)	reports	in	my	data	collection.		The	median	household	income	data	comes	from	the	US	Census	Bureau’s	annual	Household	Income	reports	and	was	originally	collected	through	the	1-year	American	Community	Surveys.		In	each	annual	report,	the	US	Census	Bureau	presents	a	table	with	the	median	household	income,	in	dollars,	for	each	state	for	that	year.		The	next	control	I	use	is	the	proportion	unemployed.		This	data	is	from	the	US	Department	of	Labor	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics,	which	is	a	fact-finding	agency	for	
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the	federal	government	that	deals	with	labor	statistics.		For	each	year,	the	agency	offers	a	table	with	the	unemployment	rate	for	each	state.		I	include	this	control	because	the	unemployment	rate	could	affect	several	of	my	health	insurance	outcomes.		As	the	unemployment	rate	increases,	it	means	that	fewer	people	are	getting	insurance	through	their	employers,	which	decreases	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	their	employer,	but	could	also	increase	the	proportion	of	people	who	are	getting	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	because	they	can	no	longer	get	it	through	an	employer.		The	unemployment	rate	could	also	affect	the	uninsured	rate.		If	an	employed	individual	who	solely	obtains	his	insurance	through	his	employer	suddenly	becomes	unemployed,	he	will	no	longer	have	employer-based	insurance	and	may	not	have	access	to	affordable	insurance	from	another	source,	leaving	him	uninsured.		For	this	reason,	the	uninsured	rate	is	bound	to	increase	when	the	unemployment	rate	increases.		Education	may	also	affect	a	person’s	knowledge	of	health	insurance,	which	is	why	I	also	include	a	variable	that	controls	for	a	person’s	education	level.		By	the	time	a	person	graduates	high	school,	they	should	have	acquired	the	knowledge	to	make	informed	decisions	about	their	medical	needs,	including	what	type	of	insurance	best	suits	and	is	affordable	to	them.		Individuals	who	do	not	graduate	high	school	may	not	have	such	knowledge	and	therefore	might	not	be	able	to	make	informed	decisions	about	where	they	should	obtain	their	insurance	from,	what	type	of	insurance	they	need	to	suit	their	medical	needs,	and	how	much	they	should	pay	for	insurance.		This	education	data	is	from	the	US	Census	Bureau	American	Fact	Finder,	a	fact	finder	that	allows	one	to	easily	search	through	data	provided	by	the	US	Census	
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Bureau.		The	data	was	originally	collected	through	the	1-year	American	Community	Surveys	and	is	presented	in	yearly	tables	by	state.	I	also	control	for	two	health	status	variables	that	could	affect	how	much	a	person’s	insurance	costs.		The	first	is	the	proportion	of	adults	18	and	older	that	smoke.		I	include	this	control	because	smoking	can	increase	insurance	premium	prices.		In	fact,	the	ACA	permits	that	smokers	can	be	charged	up	to	50	percent	more	for	their	premiums	than	non-smokers	(Obamacare	Facts	2017).		Paying	the	price	of	a	premium	plus	an	additional	50	percent	may	make	insurance	unaffordable	for	smokers,	which	would	then	decrease	the	quantity	of	insurance	demanded	by	smokers	and,	in	turn,	increase	the	uninsured	rate.		For	the	years	2013	to	2015,	this	data	is	from	the	Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation.		For	the	years	2010	to	2012,	it	comes	from	the	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention	(CDC).		The	data	the	Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation	presents	for	2013	to	2015	originally	comes	from	the	CDC;	the	Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation	simply	organizes	and	presents	it	in	tables.		In	other	words,	one	could	find	the	data	from	the	Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation	on	the	CDC’s	website,	meaning	that	the	data	from	both	sources	is	comparable,	as	it	is	essentially	measured	and	collected	the	same	way.		The	2011	and	2012	data	comes	from	the	article	“State-Specific	Prevalence	of	Current	Cigarette	Smoking	and	Smokeless	Tobacco	Use	Among	Adults	Aged	≥	18	Years-	United	States,	2011-2013.”		This	article	includes	a	table	that	has	the	state-level	data	for	both	years.		The	2010	data	comes	from	the	5-year	report	on	tobacco	control,	“Tobacco	Control	State	Highlights	2010.”		This	report	is	split	up	by	state	and	the	smoking	rate	for	adults	18	and	older	for	each	state	in	2010	is	given.			
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The	second	health	status	control	is	the	proportion	of	adults	18	and	older	who	are	obese	(a	body	mass	index	of	30	or	greater).		I	include	this	control	because	obesity	can	increase	health	insurance	premiums.		According	to	the	ACA,	employers	can	charge	employees	an	extra	30	percent	of	the	total	cost	of	individual	or	family	coverage	if	they	are	obese	(Ellin	2015).		An	increase	in	obesity	could	therefore	directly	increase	the	average	monthly	family	premium	per	employee	for	employer-based	insurance.		Obesity	data	is	from	“The	State	of	Obesity,”	a	website	run	by	the	Trust	for	America’s	Health	and	the	Robert	Wood	Johnson	Foundation.		Data	presented	by	this	website	comes	from	the	Behavioral	Risk	Factor	Surveillance	System,	a	state-level	system	of	health	survey	data	that	is	gathered	through	phone	surveys	that	are	administered	with	the	help	of	the	CDC.		The	state-level	data	is	presented	in	annual	tables.			My	last	control	is	the	race	composition	of	each	state.		My	dataset	includes	the	proportion	white,	proportion	African	American,	proportion	American	Indian/Alaska	native,	proportion	Asian,	proportion	two	or	more	races,	and	proportion	Hawaiian.		Since	all	of	these	categories	together	are	equal	to	100	percent,	I	drop	proportion	Hawaiian	in	my	regressions.		This	data	is	from	the	US	Census	Bureau	American	Fact	Finder,	which	presents	the	data	in	annual	tables.		One	reason	I	include	race	composition	as	a	control	is	because	racial	proportions	could	affect	spending	on	the	ACA.		Tope	and	Hickman	(2012)	find	that	having	a	higher	African	American	population	decreases	spending	on	CHIP.		Because	CHIP	is	a	similar	program	to	the	ACA	in	that	it	is	a	federal	program	that	gives	state	leaders	control	over	implementation	decisions,	greater	proportions	of	African	Americans	could	
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potentially	decrease	the	amount	of	money	states	are	willing	to	spend	on	the	ACA.		Furthermore,	politicians	often	hold	racial	biases,	which	means	that	they	may	be	more	willing	to	fulfill	the	needs	of	certain	racial	groups	of	constituents	than	others.		Controlling	for	race	proportions	ensures	that	state	leaders	are	not	enacting	certain	policies	simply	because	enacting	such	policies	will	satisfy	the	group	of	constituents	they	“favor.”		Another	reason	I	control	for	state	race	proportions	is	because	non-whites	have	historically	not	had	equal	access	to	employment	opportunities	and	as	high	paying	jobs	as	whites	have.			If	non-whites	hold	low-wage,	part	time	jobs,	it	is	less	likely	that	they	will	be	able	to	get	insurance	through	their	employer	because	such	jobs	usually	do	not	provide	or	provide	limited	access	to	employer-based	insurance.	This	means	that	as	the	proportion	of	non-whites	increases,	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	their	employer	will	decrease	(Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation	2013).		Finally,	according	to	the	Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation,	2/3	of	uninsured	African	Americans	and	American	Indians/Alaska	natives	had	incomes	below	the	Medicaid	expansion	threshold	of	138	percent	of	the	FPL	before	the	ACA	was	enacted.		This	statistic	could	affect	a	state’s	decision	to	implement	the	expansion	because	if	a	state	does	not	implement	it,	these	groups	of	people	will	likely	continue	to	remain	uninsured	(Henry	J.	Kaiser	Family	Foundation	2013).		I	present	two	tables	below	with	descriptive	statistics	for	each	of	my	health	insurance	outcome,	partisanship,	and	implementation	variables.		Table	1	provides	the	mean	and	standard	deviations	across	all	50	states	by	year	for	each	of	my	health	
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insurance	outcomes.		As	shown	in	the	table,	just	over	half	of	all	people	get	insurance	through	their	employer.		This	proportion	(approximately	0.55	to	0.56)	is	quite	constant	from	2010	to	2015.		The	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	is	also	rather	constant	from	2010	to	2015,	only	fluctuating	between	0.13	and	0.14.		The	uninsured	rate	fluctuates	between	0.13	and	0.14	between	2010	and	2013,	but	then	decreases	to	0.11	in	2014	and	then	0.09	in	2015.		The	uninsured	rate	likely	drops	in	2014	because	this	is	the	year	when	the	ACA	was	implemented.		The	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	also	rises	from	a	pre-ACA	implementation	value	of	approximately	0.17	to	a	post-ACA	implementation	value	of	0.19	for	the	same	reason.			The	average	monthly	family	premium	per	employee	for	employer-based	insurance	gradually	increases	each	year	from	$15768.16	in	2013	to	$17136.46	in	2015.		Higher	monthly	silver	premium	prices	than	bronze	ones	reflect	the	fact	that	the	insurance	company	pays	70	percent	of	an	individual’s	health	care	costs	in	a	silver	plan,	whereas	they	only	pay	60	percent	in	a	bronze	plan.	Table	2	presents	annual	(from	2010	to	2015)	information	on	my	partisanship	and	implementation	variables,	including	how	many	states	had	each	type	of	governor	(Democrat,	Republican,	or	Independent),	legislature	(Democrat,	Republican,	split),	how	many	states	implemented	and	did	not	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion,	and	how	many	states	implemented	each	type	of	exchange		(federally-facilitated,	state-based,	or	partnership).		In	2014	when	the	Medicaid	
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Table	1.	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	Descriptive	Statistics	
VARIABLE		 YEAR			 2010		 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015		Proportion	Uninsured		
	0.14	(0.0414)			
	0.14	(0.0419)	 	0.14	(0.0414)	 	0.13	(0.0386)	 	0.11	(0.0343)	 	0.09	(0.0313)	
Proportion	Covered	Through	Medicaid		
0.16	(0.0358)	 0.17	(0.0358)	 0.17	(0.0348)	 0.17	(0.0356)	 0.19	(0.0405)	 0.19	(0.0457)	
Proportion	Covered	Through	Employer		
0.56	(0.0569)	 0.56	(0.0580)	 0.56	(0.0574)	 0.55	(0.0561)	 0.55	(0.0544)	 0.56	(0.0536)	
Proportion	Covered	Through	Direct	Purchase		
0.134	(0.0253)	 0.13	(0.0253)	 0.13	(0.0238)	 0.13	(0.0243)	 0.13	(0.0257)	 0.14	(0.0255)	
Monthly	Avg.	Fam.	Premium		
_____	 _____	 _____	 1314.01	(101.51)	 1367.92	(91.33)	 1428.04	(95.00)	
Monthly	Silver	Premium		
_____	 _____	 _____	 _____	 270.46	(61.41)	 268.48	(67.10)	
Monthly	Bronze	Premium		
_____	 _____	 _____	 _____	 207.16	(52.21)	 208.58	(54.73)	
Notes:	This	table	includes	descriptive	statistics	for	the	following	health	insurance	outcomes	in	my	dataset:	proportion	uninsured,	proportion	covered	through	Medicaid,	proportion	covered	through	employer,	average	monthly	family	premium	per	employer	for	employee-based	insurance,	monthly	silver	premium	for	40	year-old	non-smoker	making	$30,000	per	year	before	tax	credits,	and	monthly	bronze	premium	for	40	year-old	non-smoker	making	$30,000	per	year	before	tax	credits.		The	mean	value	of	each	variable	across	all	50	states	is	presented.		Standard	deviations	for	each	variable	across	all	50	states	are	in	parentheses.			expansion	and	state	exchange	components	of	the	ACA	were	first	enacted,	just	under		
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Table	2.	Partisanship	and	Implementation	Descriptive	Statistics	
VARIABLE		 YEAR			 2010		 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015		Democrat	Governor		
	26			
	20	 	20	 	19	 	21	 	18	
Republican	Governor		 24	 29	 29	 30	 28	 31	Independent	Governor		 0	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	Democrat	Legislature		 27	 16	 15	 19	 19	 11	Republican	Legislature		 14	 25	 27	 26	 27	 30	Split	Legislature		 8	 8	 7	 4	 3	 8	Medicaid	Expansion	Yes		
_____	 _____	 _____	 _____	 24	 27	
Medicaid	Expansion	No		
_____	 _____	 _____	 _____	 26	 23	
Federally-facilitated		 _____	 _____	 _____	 _____	 28	 28	State-based	 _____	 _____	 _____	 _____	 15		 15	Partnership	 _____	 _____	 _____	 _____	 7	 7		
Notes:	This	table	includes	descriptive	statistics	for	the	following	variables	in	my	dataset:	governor,	legislature,	Medicaid	expansion,	and	exchange.		Each	state	falls	into	one	category	for	governor,	one	category	for	legislature,	one	category	for	Medicaid	expansion,	and	one	category	for	exchange	for	each	year.		Presented	are	the	number	of	states	that	fall	into	each	category.					half	of	the	states	(21)	had	Democrat	governors,	while	the	rest	had	Republican	ones.		Nearly	identically,	19	states	had	Democrat	legislatures,	while	27	had	Republican	ones,	and	3	had	split	ones.		Medicaid	expansion	implementation	was	approximately	
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evenly	split	with	24	states	implementing	and	26	choosing	not	to.		Just	over	half	of	the	states	(28)	implemented	a	federally-facilitated	exchange,	while	only	15	implemented	a	state-based	one,	and	7	implemented	a	partnership	one.		The	three	states	that	changed	from	not	implementing	the	Medicaid	expansion	in	2014	to	implementing	it	in	2015	were	Michigan,	New	Hampshire,	and	Pennsylvania.		Finally,	the	six	states	that	changed	executive	partisanship	between	2014	and	2015	were	Arkansas,	Illinois,	Kentucky,	Maryland,	Massachusetts,	and	Pennsylvania,	while	the	nine	that	changed	legislative	partisanship	were	Colorado,	Maine,	Minnesota,	Nevada,	New	Hampshire,	New	Mexico,	New	York,	Washington,	and	West	Virginia.		
IV.	Methodology	The	central	question	I	attempt	to	answer	in	my	research	is:	does	state	executive	and	legislative	partisanship	affect	health	insurance	outcomes?		To	begin,	partisanship	can	affect	health	insurance	outcomes	in	at	least	one	of	two	ways.		It	can	affect	them	directly	or	it	can	affect	them	indirectly	through	the	way	in	which	it	affects	how	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	exchange	components	of	the	ACA	are	implemented.		In	order	to	determine	whether	the	effect	of	partisanship	on	health	insurance	outcomes	comes	directly	or	indirectly	through	implementation,	I	complete	a	mediation	analysis	where	implementation	is	the	mediator	variable.		To	do	this	analysis,	I	first	run	a	group	of	regressions	that	looks	at	the	sum	of	the	direct	and	indirect	effects	of	partisanship	on	health	insurance	outcomes,	meaning	that	implementation	is	not	included	as	a	variable.		I	call	this	set	of	regressions	
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Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(Without	Implementation).			In	order	to	determine	whether	or	not	partisanship	could	affect	health	insurance	outcomes	indirectly	through	implementation,	I	next	run	two	regressions	that	break	this	potential	indirect	effect	into	two	parts.		First,	I	look	at	how	partisanship	affects	implementation	of	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	exchange	components	of	the	ACA.		This	group	of	equations,	which	I	name	Partisanship	à	Implementation,	is	represented	by	arrow	1	in	figure	1	below.		I	then	look	at	how	the	implementation	affects	health	insurance	outcomes.		This	group	of	equations	is	named	Implementation	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	and	is	represented	by	arrow	2	in	figure	1	below.		Finally,	I	re-run	the	exact	same	equations	that	I	run	in	my	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(Without	Implementation)	group	of	regressions,	but	this	time	do	include	implementation	as	an	independent	variable	to	control	for	the	effect	that	implementation	might	have	on	health	insurance	outcomes.		Running	this	last	set	of	regressions,	which	I	call	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(With	Implementation)	and	are	represented	by	arrow	3	in	figure	1	below,	allows	me	to	see	whether	partisanship	has	a	direct	effect	on	health	insurance	outcomes	once	its	indirect	effect	through	implementation	is	controlled	for.		I	will	either	find	that	partisanship	directly	affects	health	insurance	outcomes	or	that	partisanship	only	indirectly	affects	health	insurance	outcomes	through	the	help	of	arrows	1	and	2.		I	could	also	potentially	find	that	partisanship	neither	affects	health	insurance	outcomes	directly	nor	indirectly.					
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Figure	1.	Mediation	Analysis											 			In	each	regression	I	run,	the	following	controls	are	included:	proportion	of	people	living	below	poverty,	proportion	unemployed,	median	household	income,	proportion	white,	proportion	black,	proportion	American	Indian/Native	Alaskan,	proportion	Asian,	proportion	two	or	more	races,	proportion	high	school	graduate	or	higher,	proportion	of	adults	who	smoke,	and	proportion	of	adults	who	are	obese.		Instead	of	listing	out	each	of	these	controls	for	each	written-out	regression	specification	in	this	section,	I	define	Zst	as	a	vector	of	all	of	my	controls.		Although	each	of	my	control	variables	are	included	in	each	regression	I	run,	the	control	variable	results	are	not	presented	in	my	results	section,	but	rather	available	from	the	author	upon	request.	Furthermore,	I	use	the	subscripts	s	and	t	on	each	of	my	variables	to	denote	state	and	time,	respectively.		Finally,	it	is	important	to	note	that	in	all	of	my	groups	of	regressions,	except	my	Partisanship	à	Implementation	group,	I	cluster	my	standard	errors	by	state	to	adjust	for	cluster-correlated	errors	within	
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states.		I	will	begin	with	my	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(Without	Implementation)	group	of	regressions.									
Equation	1:	𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"=  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! +  𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!" +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!"+ 𝛽!𝑍!" +  𝜀!"		*Note:	The	regression	above	is	specified	for	partisanship	=	executive	partisanship.		When	looking	at	partisanship	=	legislative	partisanship,	I	simply	replace	DemocratGovernorst	with	DemocratLegislaturest.					I	first	run	ten	difference-in-differences	regressions	to	examine	the	effect	of	partisanship	on	health	insurance	outcomes.		In	these	regressions,	the	implementation	mediator	variable	is	not	included,	which	means	that	the	effect	of	partisanship	on	health	insurance	outcomes	is	the	sum	of	both	direct	effects	and	indirect	effects	through	implementation.		Using	a	difference-in-differences	regression	allows	me	to	examine	the	change	in	each	health	insurance	outcome	from	before	to	after	2014	(the	year	both	components	of	the	ACA	that	I	examine	were	implemented)	in	states	that	had	a	Democrat	governor	(legislature)	compared	to	states	that	did	not.		My	dependent	variables	are	the	following	five	health	insurance	outcomes:	the	uninsured	rate,	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid,	proportion	covered	through	an	employer,	proportion	covered	through	a	direct	purchase,	and	average	monthly	family	premium	per	employee	for	employer-based	insurance.		I	run	one	regression	(equation	1)	for	each	combination	of	my	partisanship	and	health	insurance	outcomes	variables.	This	means	that	in	one	
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regression	for	each	health	insurance	outcome,	my	independent	variable	is	executive	partisanship	and,	in	the	other,	it	is	legislative	partisanship.		For	executive	partisanship,	I	use	a	dummy	variable	called	DemocratGovernorst	that	is	equal	to	one	if	state	s	had	a	Democrat	governor	at	time	t	and	zero	otherwise.		Similarly,	for	legislative	partisanship,	I	use	a	dummy	variable	called	DemocratLegislaturest	that	equals	one	if	state	s	had	a	Democrat	legislature	at	time	t	and	zero	otherwise.		In	order	to	use	difference-in-differences	equations	and	compare	outcomes	from	before	to	after	2014,	I	create	a	new	variable,	which	I	call	postt.		Postt	is	simply	a	dummy	variable	for	after	2014;	if	year	t	is	2014	or	2015,	postt	equals	one	and	if	year	t	is	2010	to	2013,	postt	equals	zero.		In	these	difference-in-differences	regressions,	postt	is	a	variable	of	interest	because	its	coefficient	tells	me	how	much	each	health	insurance	outcome	changed	from	before	to	after	2014	in	states	that	had	Republican	or	Independent	(split)	governors	(legislatures).		I	also	interact	postt	with	the	DemocratGovernorst	(DemocratLegislaturest)	to	create	a	postt*DemocratGovernorst	(post*DemocratLegislaturest)	variable.		The	coefficient	on	postt*DemocratGovernorst	(postt*DemocratLegislaturest)	tells	me	how	much	more	each	health	insurance	outcome	changed	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	states	that	had	Democrat	governors	(legislatures)	than	in	those	that	did	not.		Interpreting	the	coefficients	on	each	of	these	variables	allows	me	to	compare	the	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	each	health	insurance	outcome	in	states	with	Democrat	governors	(legislatures)	to	those	with	Republican	or	Independent	(split)	ones.		I	will	next	move	on	to	explaining	my	next	set	of	regressions,	which	I	call	Partisanship	à	Implementation.			
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Equation	2:	𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟! + 𝛽!𝑍! +  𝜀!		*Note:	The	regression	above	is	specified	for	partisanship	=	executive	partisanship.		When	looking	at	partisanship	=	legislative	partisanship,	I	simply	replace	DemocratGovernors	with	DemocratLegislatures.						 My	Partisanship	à	Implementation	regressions	determine	whether	there	is	an	effect	of	partisanship	on	the	implementation	of	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	exchange	components	of	the	ACA.		For	these	regressions,	I	only	use	the	year	2014	from	my	dataset	because	implementation	decisions	were	only	made	once	by	each	state.		In	other	words,	implementation	decisions	were	not	made	in	2014	and	then	made	again	in	2015.		Furthermore,	this	means	that	the	variables	in	these	regressions	only	vary	by	state	s	and	not	time	t.		In	these	regressions,	the	independent	variable	is	partisanship	and	the	dependent	variable	is	implementation.		I	run	two	regressions,	following	the	format	of	equation	2,	for	each	of	the	two	dependent	variables	(Medicaid	expansion	implementation	and	exchange	implementation).		In	one	of	the	two	regressions	for	each	dependent	variable,	executive	partisanship	is	the	independent	variable.		In	the	other	two	regressions	for	each	dependent	variable,	legislative	partisanship	is	the	independent	variable.		The	dummy	variable	DemocratGovernors	is	again	used	for	executive	partisanship	and	the	dummy	variable	DemocratLegislatures	is	again	used	for	legislative	partisanship.		When	my	implementation	variable	is	the	Medicaid	expansion,	I	use	a	dummy	variable,	called	MedicaidExpansions.		If	the	Medicaid	expansion	was	implemented	in	state	s	in	2014,	the	dummy	variable	equals	one.		Finally,	because	the	state-exchange	
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variable	can	be	one	of	three	categories	(federally-facilitated,	state-based,	or	partnership),	I	am	unable	to	use	a	simple	dummy	variable.		Instead	each	category	of	a	state	exchange	takes	a	different	value	when	state	exchange	implementation	is	the	dependent	variable.		1	equals	a	federally-facilitated	exchange,	2	equals	partnership,	and	3	equals	state-based.		For	my	Partisanship	à	Implementation	regressions,	I	use	probit	and	multinomial	probit	equations.		When	the	dependent	variable	is	MedicaidExpansions,	I	use	a	probit	model	because	the	dependent	variable	can	only	take	one	of	two	values.		Using	a	probit	model	allows	me	to	estimate	how	partisanship	changes	the	probability	that	Medicaid	will	be	expanded.		My	variables	of	interest	in	these	regressions	are	the	partisanship	dummy	variables	(DemocratGovernors	and	DemocratLegislatures).		Because	I	run	a	probit	regression,	I	examine	the	average	marginal	effects	on	DemocratGovernors	(DemocratLegislatures).		The	average	marginal	effects	tell	me	how	much	having	a	Democrat	governor	(legislature)	changes	the	probability	that	Medicaid	will	be	expanded.		When	the	dependent	variable	is	exchange	implementation,	I	must	use	a	multinomial	probit	equation	because	there	are	more	than	two	possible	categories	that	the	dependent	variable	can	fall	into.		Using	a	multinomial	probit	model	allows	me	to	estimate	how	many	percentage	points	more	likely	a	Democrat	governor	(legislature),	compared	to	a	Republican	or	Independent	(split)	one,	is	to	implement	each	type	of	exchange.		My	variables	of	interest	in	these	regressions	are	again	DemocratGovernors	and	DemocratLegislatures	and,	because	I	run	a	multinomial	probit	regression,	I	again	examine	the	average	marginal	effect	on	each	one.		The	average	marginal	effects	tell	
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me	how	much	having	a	Democrat	governor	(legislature)	changes	the	probability	that	each	type	of	state	exchange	will	be	implemented.		Finally,	I	run	one	more	probit	equation	(for	implementation	=	Medicaid	expansion)	and	one	more	multinomial	probit	equation	(for	implementation	=	exchange	type)	that	follow	the	general	form	of	equation	3	below.		
Equation	3:		𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!= 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟! + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒!+ 𝛽!𝑍! +  𝜀!	
	
	
	For	each	of	these	equations,	I	include	both	executive	and	legislative	partisanship	in	one	equation.		I	also	drop	Alaska	from	my	dataset	because	it	was	the	only	state	that	had	an	Independent	governor	in	2014.		Because	I	drop	Alaska,	and	therefore	the	category	of	Independent	governors	from	my	dataset,	I	only	include	the	DemocratGovernors	variable	for	executive	partisanship	in	these	equations.		Republican	governor	is	the	executive	partisanship	category	I	leave	out	and	therefore	compare	my	Democrat	governor	results	to.		For	legislative	partisanship,	I	include	DemocratLegislatures	and	also	SplitLegislatures.		SplitLegislatures	is	a	dummy	variable	that	equals	one	if	a	state	had	a	split	legislature	(refer	to	data	section	for	how	a	split	legislature	is	defined).		Republican	legislature	is	the	legislative	partisanship	category	I	leave	out	and	therefore	compare	my	Democrat	and	split	legislature	results	to.		The	next	group	of	regressions	I	run	are	called	my	
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Implementation	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	regressions.		Equations	4,	5,	and	6	below	are	each	part	of	this	set	of	regressions.			
Equation	4:	For	Implementation	=	Medicaid	expansion:		𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!" =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!	+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑍!" +  𝜀!"		
Equation	5:	For	Implementation	=	Federally-facilitated	or	state-based	
exchange:		𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"=  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!	+𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑍!" +  𝜀!"		
Equation	6:	For	Implementation	=	Medicaid	expansion	and	federally-
facilitated	or	state-based	exchange:		
	𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"=  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤!+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤!	+𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑍!" +  𝜀!"					 In	my	Implementation	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	group	of	regressions,	I	look	at	how	the	implementation	of	each	of	the	two	components	of	the	law	affects	a	variety	of	health	insurance	outcomes.		I	run	two	regressions	for	each	health	insurance	outcome.		In	one	regression,	represented	by	equation	4,	the	independent	variable	is	the	Medicaid	expansion	implementation.		In	the	other	regression,	represented	by	equation	5,	the	independent	variables	are	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	and	a	state-based	exchange.		My	omitted	category	is	the	partnership	exchange.		For	most	of	my	health	insurance	outcomes,	I	use	a	difference-in-differences	specification,	which	allows	me	to	examine	the	change	in	the	health	
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insurance	outcome	from	before	to	after	2014	(the	year	both	components	of	the	law	were	implemented)	in	states	that	implemented	the	Medicaid	expansion	compared	to	in	states	that	did	not	implement	it.		Similarly,	I	am	able	to	look	at	the	change	in	the	health	insurance	outcome	in	states	that	implemented	either	federally-facilitated	or	state-based	exchange	in	2014	compared	to	states	that	instead	opted	for	a	partnership	exchange.			In	this	set	of	regressions,	I	again	use	the	postt	variable	that	I	used	in	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(Without	Implementation)	regressions.		Postt	is	a	variable	of	interest	in	this	Implementation	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	set	of	regressions,	as	its	estimated	coefficient	tells	me	how	much	health	insurance	outcomes	change	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	states	that	do	not	enact	the	Medicaid	expansion	(when	implementation	is	the	Medicaid	expansion)	and	that	do	not	enact	either	a	federally-facilitated	or	state-based	exchange,	meaning	that	they	enact	a	partnership	exchange	(when	implementation	is	state	exchange	type).		I	also	create	a	new	implementation	variable,	which	I	call	ImplementationNews	(for	example	MedicaidExpansionNews)	for	each	implementation	variable.		Similar	to	my	MedicaidExpansionst	variable,	my	MedicaidExpansionNews	variable	is	also	a	dummy	variable	that	is	equal	to	one	if	the	expansion	is	implemented	and	zero	if	it	is	not.		The	difference	between	MedicaidExpansionst	and	MedicaidExpansionNews,	however,	is	that	for	MedicaidExpansionNews,	I	code	each	state’s	Medicaid	expansion	implementation	from	2010	to	2015	based	on	its	implementation	in	2014	when	the	law	was	enacted.		This	means	that	whether	or	not	a	state	implements	the	Medicaid	expansion	cannot	change	over	time	t.		For	example,	if	state	s	implemented	the	
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Medicaid	expansion	in	2014,	the	state	is	coded	as	an	expansion	state	in	every	year	t	from	2010	to	2015.		There	were	only	three	states	(Michigan,	New	Hampshire,	and	Pennsylvania)	that	changed	from	not	expanding	in	2014	to	expanding	in	2015;	however,	they	are	coded	as	non-expansion	states	in	both	years.			Similar	to	MedicaidExpansionNews,	my	new	state	exchange	variables	are	also	dummy	variables.		For	each	type	of	exchange,	the	dummy	variable	is	equal	to	one	if	the	state	implemented	that	type	of	exchange	and	zero	otherwise.		For	example,	if	a	state	implemented	a	federally-facilitated	exchange,	the	FederallyFacilitatedNews	variable	is	equal	to	one	and	if	it	implemented	a	state-based	or	partnership	exchange,	the	variable	is	equal	to	zero.		Also	similar	to	MedicaidExpansionNews,	I	code	each	state’s	exchange	type	for	the	years	2010	to	2015	based	on	the	type	of	exchange	it	implemented	in	2014	when	the	law	was	enacted.		This	means	that	the	type	of	exchange	a	state	implements	does	not	change	over	time	t.		Unlike	for	MedicaidExpansionNews,	none	of	the	states	are	miscoded	because	none	of	them	changed	the	type	of	state	exchange	they	implemented	between	2014	and	2015.		I	create	all	of	these	new	implementation	variables	and	code	them	from	2010	to	2015	because	in	order	to	use	a	difference-in-differences	model,	I	must	have	data	for	each	of	my	variables	from	before	and	after	2014.		Furthermore,	note	that	the	subscript	t	is	no	longer	included	on	any	ImplementationNews	variables	in	the	written-out	specifications	because	each	of	these	variables	is	no	longer	changing	over	time.			I	also	interact	my	ImplementationNews	variable	(which	ImplementationNews	variable	I	use	depends	on	the	regression)	with	my	postt	variable.		The	coefficient	on	these	interactive	variables	tells	me	how	much	more	the	health	insurance	outcome	
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changed	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	states	that	implemented	a	Medicaid	expansion,	federally-facilitated	exchange,	or	state-based	exchange	than	in	those	that	did	not.		Moreover,	because	the	coefficient	on	my	postt	variable	tells	me	how	much	pre	to	post-2014	health	insurance	outcomes	changed	in	states	that	did	not	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	(federally-facilitated	or	state-based	exchange)	and	the	coefficient	on	my	postt*MedicaidExpansionNews	(postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	or	postt*StateBasedNews)	tells	me	how	much	the	pre	to	post-2014	health	insurance	outcomes	change	in	states	that	did	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	(federally-facilitated	or	state-based	exchange),	I	am	able	to	compare	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	the	health	insurance	outcomes	in	each	group	of	states.		Along	with	running	one	equation	for	each	type	of	implementation	variable,	I	also	run	one	equation	(equation	6)	that	includes	all	three	of	my	implementation	variables:	MedicaidExpansionNews,	FederallyFacilitatedNews,	and	StateBasedNews.		All	three	of	these	implementation	variables	interacted	with	post	are	also	included	in	the	equation.		Including	all	three	implementation	variables	in	one	equation	allows	me	to	control	for	the	fact	that	the	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	health	insurance	outcomes	that	I	am	seeing	as	a	result	of	exchange	implementation	may	be	correlated	with	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	vise	versa.		For	example,	in	my	equation	that	only	includes	the	FederallyFacilitatedNews	and	StateBasedNews	variables,	I	might	find	a	significant	estimated	coefficient	on	the	postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	or	postt*StateBasedNews	variable,	but	there	is	not	a	way	for	me	to	determine	if	this	significant	coefficient	is	coming	is	coming	only	from	the	way	in	which	the	state	implemented	the	federally-facilitated	or	state-based	exchange	or	if	it	could	be	
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coming	from	whether	or	not	the	state	implemented	the	Medicaid	expansion.		Including	all	three	implementation	variables	in	one	equation	allows	me	to	control	for	this.											
Equation	7:	For	Implementation	=	Medicaid	expansion:		𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!" =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝛽!𝑍!" +  𝜀!"		
Equation	8:	For	Implementation	=	Federally-facilitated	or	state-based	
exchange:			𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"=  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑍!" +  𝜀!"		
Equation	9:	For	Implementation	=	Medicaid	expansion	and	federally-
facilitated	or	state-based	exchange:	
	𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"=  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑!"+ 𝛽!𝑍!" +  𝜀!"				
	 There	are	two	health	insurance	outcome	variables	for	which	there	is	no	data	from	before	2014	because	these	variables	are	only	defined	under	the	ACA.		These	two	variables	are	the	monthly	silver	and	bronze	premiums	for	a	40	year-old	non-smoker	making	$30,000	per	year	before	tax	credits.		Because	I	do	not	have	data	from	before	2014,	there	are	not	any	pre-2014	outcomes	to	compare	the	post-2014	outcomes	to,	and	I	therefore	cannot	use	a	difference-in-differences	estimation	for	the	two	regressions	that	use	these	variables.		Instead,	I	have	to	use	an	ordinary	least	squares	(OLS)	estimation,	represented	by	equations	7	and	8	above.		When	implementation	is	the	Medicaid	expansion,	I	once	again	use	the	MedicaidExpansionst	dummy	variable	that	I	used	in	my	Partisanship	à	Implementation	regressions.		The	
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estimated	coefficient	on	this	variable	allows	me	to	determine	how	much	each	premium	price	changes	when	the	Medicaid	expansion	is	implemented	compared	to	when	it	is	not.		When	implementation	is	a	federally-facilitated	or	state-based	exchange	(I	omit	partnership	exchange),	I	use	two	dummy	variables.	FederallyFaciliatedst	equals	one	if	state	s	implemented	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	at	time	t	and	zero	otherwise.		StateBasedst	equals	one	if	state	s	implemented	a	state-based	exchange	at	time	t	and	zero	otherwise.		The	coefficient	on	FederallyFacilitatedst	tells	me	how	much	each	premium	price	changes	when	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	is	enacted	compared	to	a	partnership	and	the	coefficient	on	StateBasedst	tells	me	how	much	each	premium	price	changes	when	a	state-based	exchange	is	enacted	compared	to	a	partnership	one.		Similar	to	my	other	health	insurance	outcomes,	I	also	run	one	equation	for	each	monthly	metal-tier	premium	that	includes	all	three	implementation	variables	(equation	9).			Including	my	controls	in	these	OLS	regressions	is	especially	important	in	helping	to	reduce	omitted	variable	bias.		If	I	were	to	only	examine	the	effect	of	implementation	on	each	of	the	premium	prices,	it	would	be	extremely	hard	to	attribute	changes	in	the	premium	prices	solely	to	implementation.		For	example,	suppose	that	a	state	that	implemented	the	Medicaid	expansion	also	had	a	high	proportion	of	people	living	below	the	poverty	line.		Lower	premium	prices	cannot	solely	be	attributed	to	the	Medicaid	expansion	implementation	in	this	case	because	premium	prices	might	have	already	been	lower	so	that	they	could	be	more	affordable.		Including	these	control	variables	in	each	OLS	regression	ensures	that	anything	that	could	affect	either	the	monthly	silver	or	bronze	premium	prices,	
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besides	ACA	implementation,	is	controlled	for	and	that	I	am	not	over	estimating	the	effect	of	either	of	my	implementation	variables	on	either	of	the	two	premium	prices.		The	OLS	estimation	is	nearly	identical	to	the	difference-in-differences	one,	but	does	not	include	the	postt,	ImplementationNews,	or	postt*ImplementationNews	variables.1		The	final	group	of	regressions	I	run	are	called	my	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(With	Implementation)	regressions.		Equations	10	and	11	below	are	part	of	this	set	of	regressions.		
	
	
Equation	10:	When	Implementation	=	Medicaid	Expansion:			𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!" =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤! +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!	+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤! +  𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!"	+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!" + 𝛽!𝑍!" +  𝜀!"		
Equation	11:	When	Implementation	=	Federally-facilitated	or	State-based	
Exchange:			𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"=  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! +   𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!	+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤!+  𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!" +  𝛽!𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!" + 𝛽!𝑍!" +  𝜀!"		*Note:	Each	regression	above	is	specified	for	partisanship	=	executive	partisanship.		When	looking	at	partisanship	=	legislative	partisanship,	I	simply	replace	“DemocratGovernorst”	with	“DemocratLegislaturest.”				
                                                1	I	also	consider	running	my	Implementation	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	regressions	using	state	fixed	effects.		Using	state	fixed	effects	allows	me	to	control	for	characteristics	of	each	state	that	could	affect	health	insurance	outcomes,	but	are	omitted	from	my	specifications.		Similar	to	reasons	why	I	have	to	run	OLS	regressions	for	the	monthly	silver	and	bronze	premium	prices,	I	choose	not	to	use	my	fixed	effects	regressions	because	I	do	not	have	enough	data.		Since	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	state	exchanges	were	not	implemented	until	2014,	the	only	data	I	am	able	to	use	for	my	fixed	effects	regressions	comes	from	2014	and	2015.		There	is	little	variation	within	states	between	these	two	years,	which	is	why	using	a	state	fixed	effects	regression	is	not	appropriate	to	use	with	the	amount	of	data	I	have.		
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	 For	this	last	group	of	regressions,	I	re-run	nearly	the	same	equations	that	I	used	in	my	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(Without	Implementation)	group	of	regressions.		The	only	difference	is	that	I	now		examine	how	partisanship	affects	health	insurance	outcomes	using	implementation	as	a	mediator	variable,	which	means	that	equations	10	and	11	are	essentially	the	same	as	equation	1,	the	only	difference	being	that	they	include	implementation	variables.		Equation	10	(implementation	=	Medicaid	expansion)	includes	the	MedicaidExpansionNews	and	Postt*MedicaidExpansionNews	and	equation	11	(implementation	=	state	exchange)	includes	the	FederallyFacilitatedNews,	Postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews,	StateBasedNews,	and	Postt*StateBasedNews	variables.	Using	implementation	as	a	mediator	variable,	and	therefore	controlling	for	implementation,	allows	me	to	determine	whether	partisanship	has	a	direct	effect	on	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	health	insurance	outcomes,	or	whether	the	effect	partisanship	has	is	strictly	coming	indirectly	through	its	effect	on	the	implementation	of	Medicaid	expansion	and	exchange	components	of	the	ACA.		I	run	four	difference-in-differences	regressions	for	each	of	the	following	five	health	insurance	outcomes:	proportion	uninsured,	proportion	covered	through	Medicaid,	proportion	covered	through	employer,	proportion	covered	through	direct	purchase,	and	average	monthly	family	premium	per	employee	for	employer-based	health	insurance.		I	use	four	regressions	to	allow	for	each	combination	of	partisanship	and	implementation	variables.				 	
V.	Results	
	
V.	A.	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(Without	Implementation)	Results	
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	 As	explained	in	the	methodology	section,	the	first	group	of	regressions	I	run	examines	the	overall	effect	(sum	of	direct	and	indirect	effects)	partisanship	has	on	health	insurance	outcomes.		I	first	use	DemocratGovernorst	for	my	partisanship	variable.		In	examining	the	estimated	coefficients	on	the	postt	variables	presented	in	table	3,	I	find	that	the	uninsured	rate	and	proportion	of	people	covered	through	an	employer	decrease	by	1.9	percentage	points	and	2.6	percentage	points,	respectively,	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	states	that	have	a	Republican	or	Independent	governor.		Both	of	these	results	are	highly	significant	with	p-values	of	0.000.		I	also	find	that	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	increases	by	2.8	percentage	points	and	the	average	monthly	family	premium	per	employee	for	employer-based	insurance	increases	by	86.78	dollars	from	before	to	after	2014	in	states	that	have	a	Republican	or	Independent	governor.		Both	of	these	results	are	also	highly	significant	with	p-values	of	0.000.		None	of	the	estimated	coefficients	on	the	postt*DemocratGovernorst	variables	presented	in	table	3	are	significant,	which	means	that	having	a	Democrat	governor	does	not	significantly	additionally	affect	the	changes	in	any	of	the	five	health	insurance	outcomes	from	pre	to	post-2014.	Although	none	of	the	estimated	coefficients	on	my	postt*DemocratGovernorst	variables	are	significant,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	standard	error	on	my	postt*DemocratGovernorst	is	17.17	dollars	when	my	health	insurance	outcome	is	the	average	monthly	family	premium	per	employee	for	employer-based	insurance.		This	value	is	quite	economically	significant.		Adding	two	times	this	standard	error	(2	*	17.14	dollars)	to	my	estimate	(11.89	dollars)	gives	me	an	upper-bound	value	of	
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Table	3.	Executive	Partisanship	and	Health	Insurance	Outcomes		
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	
Proportion	Uninsured	 Proportion	Medicaid	 Proportion	Employer	 Proportion	Direct	Purchase	 Avg.	Monthly	Family	Premium		DemocratGovernorst	 	-0.016**	(0.0073)		
	0.016**	(0.0076)	 	0.003	(0.0071)	 	0.002	(0.0038)	 	11.02	(26.45)	Postt	 -0.019***	(0.0055)		 0.028***	(0.0077)	 -0.026***	(0.0059)	 0.003	(0.0036)	 86.78***	(12.93)	Postt*DemocratGovernorst	 -0.004	(0.0071)		 0.009	(0.0093)	 -0.005	(0.0045)	 -0.003	(0.0036)	 11.89	(17.14)	R2	 	 0.652	 0.371	 0.773	 0.511	 0.589	Sample	Size	 300	 300	 300	 300	 150	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.					46.17	dollars	for	a	95	percent	confidence	interval.		Subtracting	two	times	the	standard	error	(2*17.14	dollars)	from	my	estimate	gives	me	a	lower-bound	value	of	-22.39	dollars	for	a	95	percent	confidence	interval.		In	other	words,	I	can	be	95	percent	confident	that	the	effect	of	a	Democrat	governor	on	the	average	monthly	family	premium	is	not	larger	than	46.17	dollars	and	not	smaller	than	-22.39	dollars,	but	it	could	be	anywhere	within	this	range.		I	can	be	nearly	certain	that	a	Democrat	governor	does	not	have	an	extremely	large	effect,	but	this	confidence	interval	still	includes	fairly	large	effects.		Moreover,	0	dollars	is	included	in	the	confidence	interval,	which	would	mean	that	a	Democrat	governor	could	possibly	not	effect	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	family	premium	prices	at	all.		I	cannot	not	determine	the	
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exact	effect	a	Democrat	governor	actually	has	simply	because	I	do	not	have	enough	data.		My	data	on	this	health	insurance	outcome	only	ranges	from	2013	to	2015	and,	if	I	had	more	data,	I	might	be	able	to	get	a	better	estimate	of	what	the	effect	truly	is.		For	the	two	OLS	regressions,	neither	of	the	estimated	coefficients	on	my	DemocratGovernorst	variable	are	significant.		This	means	that	controlling	for	all	of	the	control	variables	in	vector	Zst	(refer	back	to	methodology	section	for	a	list	of	these	variables),	having	a	Democrat	governor	does	not	significantly	change	either	the	monthly	silver	or	monthly	bronze	premium	price.		These	results	are	summarized	in	table	4.		I	next	use	DemocratLegislaturest	as	my	partisanship	variable.		In	examining	the	estimated	coefficients	on	the	postt	variables	presented	in	table	5,	I	find	similar	results	to	when	the	partisanship	variable	is	DemocratGovernorst.		I	find	the	uninsured	rate	and	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	their	employer	decrease	by	1.8	and	2.7	percentage	points,	respectively,	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	states	that	have	Republican	or	split	legislatures.		Both	of	these	results	are	significant	with	p-values	of	0.004	and	0.000,	respectively.		The	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	increases	by	2.4	percentage	points	from	pre	to	post-2014,	this	result	being	significant	with	a	p-value	of	0.003.		I	also	find	that	the	average	monthly	family	premium	per	employee	for	employer-based	health	insurance	increases	by	84.06	dollars	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	states	that	have	Republican	or	split	legislatures.		This	result	is	significant	with	a	p-value	of	0.000.	In	contrast	to	my	results	where	the	partisanship	variable	is	DemocratGovernorst,	I	do	find	that	two	of	my	estimated	coefficients	for	the	
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Table	4.	Executive	Partisanship	and	Metal-Tier	Premium	Prices	
	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	
	Monthly	Silver	Premium		 Monthly	Bronze	Premium		DemocratGovernorst	 	15.97	(14.81)		
	7.90	(12.69)	R2	 0.284		 0.240	Sample	Size	 100		 100	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.							postt*DemocratLegislaturest	are	significant.		I	find	that	having	a	Democrat	legislature	significantly	additionally	increases	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	Medicaid	by	1.7	percentage	points.		This	result	is	highly	significant,	as	it	yields	a	p-value	of	0.003.		I	also	find	when	the	health	insurance	outcome	is	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase,	the	estimated	coefficient	on	postt*DemocratLegislaturest	is	also	significant	with	a	p-value	of	0.013;	however,	the	sign	on	this	estimated	coefficient	is	negative,	whereas	the	coefficient	on	post	for	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	health	insurance	outcomes	is	positive.		The	sum	of	the	coefficients	is	not	significant,	meaning	that	having	a	Democrat	legislature	does	not	additionally	change	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	from	pre	to	post-2014.		These	results	lead	to	the	question	of	whether	the	additional	change	in	the	proportion	of	people	who	are	covered	through	Medicaid	from	before	to	after	2014	is	coming	indirectly	from	a	difference	in	the	way	
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Table	5.	Legislative	Partisanship	and	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	
	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	
Proportion	Uninsured	 Proportion	Medicaid	 Proportion	Employer	 Proportion	Direct	Purchase	 Avg.	Monthly	Family	Premium		DemocratLegislaturest	 	-0.021**	(0.0080)		
	0.027***	(0.0092)	 	0.003	(0.0074)	 	-0.002	(0.0052)	 	3.49	(30.16)	Postt	 -0.018***	(0.0060)		 0.024***	(0.0079)	 -0.027***	(0.0062)	 0.005	(0.0040)	 84.06***	(13.69)	Postt*DemocratLegislaturest	 -0.003	(0.0043)		 0.017***	(0.0054)	 -0.004	(0.0049)	 -0.007**	(0.0027)	 -4.46	(20.67)	R2	 	 0.660	 0.433	 0.772	 0.495	 0.579	Sample	Size	 294	 294	 294	 294	 147	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.						Democrats	versus	Republicans	or	split	legislatures	implement	either	the	Medicaid	expansion	or	state	exchange	components	of	the	ACA,	or	if	there	is	some	other	difference	between	Democrats	and	Republican	or	split	legislatures	that	leads	to	a	difference	in	these	health	insurance	outcomes.		Based	on	the	fact	that	it	is	the	proportion	of	people	who	are	covered	through	Medicaid	that	significantly	additionally	increases	when	a	Democrat	legislature	is	in	power	versus	when	a	Republican	or	split	one	is,	I	hypothesize	that	this	change	is	coming	through	the	way	in	which	Democrat	legislatures	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion.		Historically,	Medicaid	has	been	a	liberal	policy,	so	I	hypothesize	that	Democrat	legislatures	are	more	likely	to	favor	and	implement	the	expansion,	which	is	why	I	am	seeing	an	
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additional	pre	to	post-2014	change	in	the	proportion	of	people	who	are	covered	through	Medicaid	under	Democrat	legislatures.	I	do	not	find	any	other	significant	estimated	coefficients	on	my	postt*DemocratLegislaturest	variable	which	means	that	I	find	that	having	a	Democrat	legislature	does	not	significantly	additionally	change	any	of	my	other	health	insurance	outcomes	from	before	to	after	2014.		It	is	important	to	note	however,	that	when	the	health	insurance	outcome	is	the	average	monthly	family	premium,	the	standard	error	on	the	postt*DemocratLegislaturest	variable	is	20.67	dollars,	which	is	quite	economically	significant.		As	described	previously,	I	cannot	determine	the	exact	effect	a	Democrat	governor	actually	has	on	this	price	simply	because	I	have	a	small	amount	of	data.		I	can	be	95	percent	confident,	however,	that	the	effect	falls	within	a	range	of	-45.80	and	36.88	dollars.	For	the	two	OLS	regressions,	neither	of	the	estimated	coefficients	on	my	DemocratLegislaturest	variable	are	significant.		This	means	that	controlling	for	all	of	the	control	variables	in	vector	Zst	(refer	back	to	methodology	section	for	a	list	of	these	variables),	having	a	Democrat	legislature	does	not	significantly	change	either	the	monthly	silver	or	monthly	bronze	premium	price.		These	results	are	summarized	in	table	6.		Given	that	I	do	not	see	a	significant	overall	effect	of	partisanship	on	health	insurance	outcomes	in	all	of	my	regressions,	but	one,	the	next	question	I	ask	is	does	this	mean	that	partisanship	does	not	directly	or	indirectly	affect	health	insurance	outcomes	at	all?		I	hypothesize	that	partisanship	does	affect	at	least	the	implementation	of	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	law	and	that	
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Table	6.	Legislative	Partisanship	and	Metal-Tier	Premium	Prices	
	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	
	Monthly	Silver	Premium	 Monthly	Bronze	Premium		DemocratLegislaturest	 	4.75	(17.40)	 	7.69	(14.82)		R2	 	0.276		 	0.240		Sample	Size		 	98		 	98	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.						implementation	affects	health	insurance	outcomes.		If	this	is	true,	partisanship	must	at	least	significantly	indirectly	be	affecting	health	insurance	outcomes	through	implementation.		I	might	not	be	seeing	significant	results	in	the	group	of	regressions	above	simply	because	the	indirect	effect	of	partisanship	on	outcomes	through	implementation	is	too	small	to	detect	compared	to	other	factors	that	affect	health	insurance	outcomes.					
V.	B.	Partisanship	à	Implementation	Results	For	my	probit	regressions	that	use	the	Medicaid	expansion	as	the	dependent	variable	and	executive	or	legislative	partisanship	as	the	independent	variables,	my	results	confirm	my	hypothesis	that	states	under	Democrat	executive	and	legislative	control	are	more	likely	to	implement	the	expansion.		In	examining	the	average	marginal	effects	on	my	DemocratGovernors	and	DemocratLegislatures,		
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variables	presented	in	table	7,	I	find	that	having	a	Democrat	governor	increases	the	probability	of	a	Medicaid	expansion	by	31.8	percentage	points.		This	result	is	significant,	as	the	p-value	equals	0.001.		Having	a	Democrat	legislature	increases	the	probability	of	a	Medicaid	expansion	by	an	even	greater	amount,	49.8	percentage	points.		This	result	is	highly	significant,	with	the	p-value	equaling	0.000.		To	confirm	the	robustness	of	my	probit	regression	results,	I	also	run	OLS	regressions	for	each	independent	variable.		My	OLS	regressions	yield	the	same	results	that	I	find	with	my	probit	regressions:	a	Democrat	governor	(legislature)	is	more	likely	to	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	than	a	Republican	or	Independent	(split)	governor	(legislature).2			
Table	7.	Partisanship	and	Medicaid	Expansion	Implementation	
	
Notes:	This	table	presents	marginal	effects	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.			
                                                2	I	also	consider	running	both	of	these	probit	regressions	using	a	one-year	lag	on	the	DemocratGovernorst	and	DemocratLegislaturest	variables	because	the	Medicaid	expansion	was	implemented	on	January	1,	2014,	which	means	that	the	2013	governor	or	legislature	decided	what	policy	would	be	implemented.		After	examining	my	data,	however,	I	found	that	Virginia	was	the	only	state	that	changed	executive	partisanship	and	also	the	only	state	that	changed	legislative	partisanship	between	2013	and	2014.		Because	only	one	state	changed	executive	and	legislative	partisanship,	using	a	partisanship	lag	would	not	significantly	change	my	results.			
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
PARTISANSHIP	=	
DEMOCRAT	GOVERNOR	
PARTISANSHIP	=	
DEMOCRAT	
LEGISLATURE		DemocratGovernors	 	0.318***	(0.0965)	 	 _________		DemocratLegislatures	 	 _________	 	0.498***	(0.0910)		Pseudo	R2		 	0.460	 	0.611	Sample	Size		 100	 98	
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			 It	is	no	surprise	that	Democrats	are	more	likely	to	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	law,	as	Medicaid	is	historically	a	liberal	policy.		Liberals	believe	that	every	individual	should	have	access	to	healthcare	and	nobody	should	be	crowded	out	or	rejected	from	being	able	to	obtain	it.		Moreover,	they	are	willing	to	use	federal	spending	to	help	groups	that	are	not	as	easily	able	to	access	it,	such	as	the	poor,	obtain	it.		This	is	why	President	Obama	wanted	and	was	willing	to	expand	Medicaid.		Democrat	governors	and	legislatures	are	more	willing	to	expand	Medicaid	than	Republican	ones	for	the	same	reasons.			Another	explanation	for	why	Democrat	governors	and	legislatures	are	more	likely	to	enact	the	expansion	could	be	because	they	do	not	want	to	go	against	a	policy	that	their	most	influential	party	leader,	President	Obama,	designed	and	strongly	supported.		If	Democrat	state	leaders	disagree	with	a	Democrat	president’s	policy,	they	may	receive	backlash	from	other	party	members	and	Democrat	constituents	within	their	own	states	who	expect	them	to	uphold	the	policies	of	the	most	influential	party	leader.		Furthermore,	if	Democrat	state	leaders	go	against	a	Democrat	president’s	and	historically	liberal	policies,	they	may	lose	campaign	funding,	donations,	and	votes	from	their	constituents	in	the	future.		The	same	explanation	is	true	for	Republicans	that	would	choose	to	agree	with	a	Democrat	president’s	policy,	a	policy	that	does	not	align	with	typical	conservative	principles.		Both	explanations	I	present	for	why	Democrat	governors	and	legislatures	are	more	likely	to	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	are	credible;	however,	I	find	the	second	explanation	to	be	more	likely	because	politicians	are	usually	looking	to	move	up	in	their	respective	parties.		Especially	when	they	start	at	the	state	level,	politicians	are	
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always	looking	for	ways	to	get	re-elected	and	possibly	even	eventually	move	up	to	the	national	party	level.		If	Democrat	state	leaders	go	against	a	Democrat	president’s	and	historically	liberal	policies	and	do	end	up	losing	campaign	funding	and	votes	from	their	constituents	in	the	future,	their	ability	to	move	up	within	their	party	could	be	hampered.		Independents	are	typically	harder	to	judge	than	Democrats	and	Republicans.		There	was	only	one	state	(Alaska)	with	an	Independent	governor	at	the	time	the	Medicaid	expansion	was	enacted.		Alaska	chose	not	to	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion,	but	since	it	was	the	only	state	with	an	Independent	governor,	I	am	unable	to	draw	any	conclusions	about	how	Independent	governors	choose	to	act.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	my	regressions	yield	the	results	that	a	Democrat	legislature	is	even	more	likely	to	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	than	a	Democrat	governor	is.		One	reason	for	this	result	could	be	because	state	legislatures	are	more	knowledgeable	about	state	budgets	than	governors	are.		Governors	are	required	to	submit	their	budget	proposals	to	the	state	legislature.		In	order	for	the	budget	to	be	passed,	the	state	legislature	will	review	it,	change	it,	and	then	pass	it,	assuming	the	governor	does	not	veto	the	changes	it	has	made.		Because	one	of	the	state	legislature’s	main	tasks	is	to	deal	with	the	budget,	legislatures	have	a	better	idea	of	how	to	divide	up	the	state’s	money	than	governors	do	(National	Governors	Association	2015).		Relating	to	the	Medicaid	expansion,	a	Medicaid	expansion	does	cost	the	state	money	and	a	legislature	will	have	a	better	idea	than	the	governor	of	how	much	money	the	state	has	available	and	whether	that	money	is	enough	to	implement	the	expansion.	
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	 Similar	to	Jones,	Bradley,	and	Oberlander	(2013)	I	also	find	that	a	state’s	decision	about	which	type	of	exchange	to	implement	does	not	depend	on	its	executive	partisanship.		In	contrast	to	these	authors,	however,	I	find	that	legislative	partisanship	does	have	an	effect	on	the	implementation	of	the	state	exchange	component	of	the	law.		The	average	marginal	effects	on	the	DemocratGovernors	variable,	presented	in	table	8	on	the	following	page,	first	tell	me	that	having	a	Democrat	governor	does	not	significantly	change	the	probability	of	the	implementation	of	a	federally-facilitated,	state-based,	or	partnership	exchange.	Turning	to	look	at	the	average	marginal	effects	on	the	DemocratLegislatures	variable,	I	find		that	a	Democrat	legislature	decreases	the	probability	of	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	by	38.6	percentage	points	and	increases	the	probability	of	a	state-based	exchange	by	29.8	percentage	points.		These	results	are	significant	with	p-values	of	0.001	and	0.000,	respectively.		Having	a	Democrat	legislature	does	not	significantly	affect	the	probability	of	a	partnership	exchange.		One	reason	some	of	my	results	are	different	than	those	of	Jones,	Bradley,	and	Oberlander	(2013)	could	be	because	these	authors	use	pre-2014	preliminary	data	on	what	type	of	exchange	each	state	intended	to	implement,	whereas	I	use	post-2014	data,	which	is	data	on	which	type	of	exchange	each	state	actually	implemented	in	2014.	I	conjecture	that	having	a	Democrat	governor	and	Democrat	legislature	each	increase	the	likelihood	of	a	state	implementing	a	state-based	exchange	because	Democrats	generally	support	the	ACA,	as	it	is	a	law	that	was	introduced	by	a	Democrat	president.		The	ACA	calls	for	states	to	implement	their	own	state	exchanges.		If	they	choose	not	to,	they	can	opt	for	a	federally-facilitated	or	
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partnership	one.		Essentially,	if	a	state	implements	a	state-based	exchange,	it	means	they	are	choosing	to	construct	their	own	exchange	where	individuals	and	small	companies	can	shop	for	insurance	coverage.		In	other	words,	they	are	choosing	to		
Table	8.	Partisanship	and	Exchange	Implementation	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
DEPENDENT	VARIABLE:	STATE	EXCHANGE	TYPE	
	 Federally-facilitated	 State-based	 Partnership	Panel	A.		Sample	Size:	100	 	DemocratGovernors	 -0.722		 	 (0.6075)	 0.134		 	 (0.1271)	 0.588	(0.6998)	Panel	B.		Sample	Size:	98	 	DemocratLegislatures	 -0.386***	(0.1206)	 0.298***	(0.0823)	 0.088		 	 (0.1154)	
Notes:	This	table	presents	marginal	effects	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		Panel	A	represents	the	multinomial	probit	regression	where	the	independent	variable	is	executive	partisanship	and	Panel	B	represents	the	multinomial	probit	regression	where	the	independent	variable	is	legislative	partisanship.	***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.						implement	the	law’s	preferred	type	of	exchange.		As	Jones,	Bradley,	and	Oberlander	(2013)	describe	it,	they	are	“giving	into”	implementing	the	law.		Similarly,	having	a	Democrat	governor	and	Democrat	legislature	each	decrease	the	probability	of	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	because	Democrats	do	support	the	ACA’s	components	and	are	eager	to	implement	the	ACA	and	their	own	exchanges	rather	than	waiting	for	the	federal	government	to	come	in	and	operate	an	exchange.			Only	seven	states	implemented	a	partnership	exchange:	Arkansas,	Delaware,	Illinois,	Iowa,	Michigan,	New	Hampshire,	and	West	Virginia.		Arkansas	had	a	Democrat	governor	and	Republican	legislature,	Delaware,	Illinois,	and	West	Virginia	
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had	both	Democrat,	Iowa	had	a	Republican	and	split,	Michigan	had	both	Republican,	and	New	Hampshire	had	a	Democrat	and	split.		One	reason	states	that	had	both	a	Democrat	governor	and	legislature	could	have	implemented	the	partnership	exchange	was	because	they	did	not	have	the	government	administrative	capacity	to	fully	implement	their	own	state-based	exchange	and	needed	assistance	from	the	federal	government.		This	reasoning	is	similar	to	one	of	the	factors	Tope	and	Hickman	(2012)	reference	in	their	analysis	of	how	states	decided	to	implement	CHIP.		Tope	and	Hickman	(2012)	conclude	that	states	that	are	more	bureaucratized	are	better	able	to	study	and	develop	policy,	therefore	increasing	CHIP	funding.		The	same	could	be	true	for	the	state	exchange	component	of	the	ACA,	which	is	why	a	state	that	is	not	as	administratively	developed	as	others,	but	still	under	Democrat	executive	and	legislative	control,	might	opt	for	a	partnership	exchange;	they	need	federal	assistance,	but	would	still	prefer	to	implement	and	run	at	least	part	of	their	own	exchange.			States	with	different	executive	and	legislative	partisanships,	such	as	Arkansas,	Iowa,	and	New	Hampshire	might	have	chosen	to	implement	a	partnership	exchange	because	the	two	branches	of	government	could	not	agree	on	either	the	federally-facilitated	or	state-based	one.		If	Democrats	are	more	likely	to	implement	a	state-based	and	Republicans	a	federally-facilitated	exchange,	middle-ground	is	a	partnership	exchange,	as	it	is	a	hybrid	of	the	two.		Finally,	one	reason	a	fully	Republican	state,	such	as	Michigan,	might	have	chosen	to	implement	a	partnership	exchange	is	because	it	did	not	want	to	“give	into”	the	ACA	and	implement	its	own	exchange	as	the	law	calls	for,	but	it	still	wanted	to	maintain	some	of	its	policy	
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autonomy,	as	Jones,	Bradley,	and	Oberlander	(2012)	hypothesize.		Again,	implementing	a	partnership	exchange	is	the	middle	ground	between	these	two	options.	For	my	regressions	that	include	executive	and	legislative	partisanship	variables,	I	find	that	having	a	Democrat	legislature	instead	of	a	Republican	one	increases	the	probability	of	a	Medicaid	expansion	by	49.8	percentage	points.		This	result	is	highly	significant	with	a	p-value	of	0.000.		Furthermore,	I	find	that	having	a	Democrat	governor	instead	of	a	Republican	one	and	having	a	split	legislature	instead	of	a	Republican	one	does	not	significantly	change	the	probability	of	a	Medicaid	expansion.		These	results	are	summarized	in	table	9.				
Table	9.	Medicaid	Expansion	Implementation,	Executive,	and	Legislative	
Partisanship	
	
Notes:	This	table	presents	marginal	effects	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.					
INDEPENDENT	VARIABLES	 PROBABILITY	OF	A	MEDICAID	
EXPANSION		DemocratGovernors	 	0.119	(0.0926)		DemocratLegislatures		 	 0.498	(0.1301)		SplitLegislatures	 0.142	(0.1084)		Pseudo	R2		 	0.600	Sample	Size		 96	
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Turning	to	exchange	implementation,	having	a	Democrat	governor	decreases	the	probability	of	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	by	20.3	percentage	points	and	increases	the	probability	of	a	partnership	exchange	by	12.9	percentage	points.		These	results	are	significant	with	p-values	of	0.005	and	0.019,	respectively.		Having	a	Democrat	legislature	decreases	the	probability	of	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	by	37.1	percentage	points	and	increases	the	probability	of	a	state-based	exchange	by	26.4	percentage	points.		Both	of	these	results	are	highly	significant	with	p-values	of	0.000.		Finally,	having	a	split	legislature	decreases	the	probability	of	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	by	43.8	percentage	points	and	increases	the	probability	of	a	state-based	exchange	by	37.5	percentage	points.		Both	of	these	results	are	also	highly	significant	with	p-values	of	0.000.		These	results	are	summarized	in	table	10.				
	
Table	10.	Exchange	Implementation,	Executive,	and	Legislative	Partisanship	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
DEPENDENT	VARIABLE:	STATE	EXCHANGE	TYPE	
	 Federally-facilitated	 State-based	 Partnership		DemocratGovernors			
	-0.203***		 	 (0.0728)		
	0074		 	 (0.0524)	 	0.129**	(0.0549)	DemocratLegislatures	 -0.371***	(0.0771)		 0.264***	(0.0630)	 0.107		 	 (0.0704)	SplitLegislatures	 -0.438***	(0.1182)		 0.375***	(0.0955)	 0.063	(0.0708)	Sample	Size	 96	
Notes:	This	table	presents	marginal	effects	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.			
		
V.	C.	Implementation	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	Results	
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In	this	set	of	regressions,	I	first	run	the	regressions	that	use	MedicaidExpansionNews	as	my	implementation	(independent	variable).		By	examining	the	estimated	coefficients	on	the	postt	and	postt*MedicaidExpansionNews,	variables	in	table	11	below,	I	am	first	able	to	conclude	that	the	uninsured	rate	decreases	by	1.2	percentage	points	from	before	to	after	2014	in	non-expansion	states.		It	decreases	by	an	additional	1.2	percentage	points	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	states	that	implement	the	expansion.		These	results	are	significant	with	p-values	of	0.016	and	0.005,	respectively.		I	also	find	that	the	proportion	of	people	covered	by	Medicaid	increases	by	1.5	percentage	points	from	before	to	after	2014	in	non-expansion	states.		It	increases	by	an	additional	2.9	percentage	points	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	states	that	implement	the	expansion.		Both	of	these	results	are	significant	with	p-values	of	0.044	and	0.000,	respectively.		Finally,	I	find	that	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	their	employer	decreases	by	2.6	percentage	points	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	non-expansion	states.		It	decreases	by	an	additional	0.7	percentage	points	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	states	that	implement	the	expansion.		Both	of	these	results	are	significant	with	p-values	of	0.000	and	0.046,	respectively.		Even	in	non-expansion	states,	one	reason	why	the	uninsured	rate	decreases	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	Medicaid	increases,	and	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	an	employer	decreases	is	because	of	the	individual	mandate	penalty	established	by	the	ACA.		The	individual	mandate	states	that	all	legal	residents	of	the	United	States	must	obtain	health	insurance.		If	a	person	does	not	obtain	insurance,	they	receive	a	tax	penalty	(Frean	
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Gruber,	and	Sommers	2016).		In	other	words,	more	people	will	obtain	insurance	out	of	the	fear	that	they	will	receive	a	tax	penalty	if	they	do	not,	which	in	turn	means	that	the	uninsured	rate	will	decrease.		Furthermore,	before	the	individual	mandate	was	enacted,	there	might	have	been	individuals	who	were	eligible	for	Medicaid,	but	did	not	enroll	in	the	program	because	they	were	not	required	to	have	insurance.		
Table	11.	Medicaid	Expansion	Implementation	and	Health	Insurance	
Outcomes	
	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	Proportion	Uninsured	 Proportion	Medicaid	 Proportion	Employer	 Proportion	Direct	Purchase	 Monthly	Avg.	Family	Premium		MedicaidExpansionNews	 	 -0.026***	(0.0075)	 	 0.022**	(0.0101)	 	0.012	(0.0088)	 	 0.003	(0.0063)	 	 -28.73	(25.45)		Postt	 	-0.012**	(0.0048)		
	0.015**	(0.0071)	 	-0.026***	(0.0053)	 	0.006	(0.0036)	 	81.40***	(14.31)	Postt*MedicaidExpansionNews	 -0.012***	(0.0042)		 0.029***	(0.0043)	 -0.007**	(0.0031)	 -0.008***	(0.0024)	 21.42	(16.17)	R2	 0.713	 0.467	 0.779	 0.515	 0.589	Sample	Size	 300	 300	 300	 300	 150	
Notes:		This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.					 	Once	the	mandate	was	enacted,	these	individuals	might	have	decided	that	they	wanted	to	obtain	their	Medicaid	insurance	in	order	to	avoid	the	tax	penalty,	in	turn	increasing	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid.		The	proportion	of	
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people	getting	insurance	through	their	employer	might	decrease	because	of	the	increased	demand	for	insurance	through	Medicaid.			Another	explanation	for	the	pre	to	post-2014	decrease	in	the	uninsured	rate	in	non-expansion	states	could	also	be	the	newly	ACA-implemented	subsidized	premiums	for	private	insurance	purchased	on	the	exchanges.		If	individuals	realize	that	they	will	be	able	to	purchase	insurance	at	a	cheaper	price,	they	will	be	more	likely	to	purchase	it,	which	could	decrease	the	uninsured	rate.		A	final	explanation	that	applies	to	the	pre	to	post-2014	non-expansion	state	increase	in	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	could	be	a	greater	general	awareness	about	health	insurance.		When	the	ACA	was	passing	through	the	White	House,	it	received	a	lot	of	publicity.		Especially	when	the	Medicaid	expansion	component	of	the	law	was	under	debate	and	in	the	news,	it	is	possible	that	there	was	a	group	of	individuals	who	did	not	realize	they	qualified	for	Medicaid	and,	because	of	a	greater	awareness	about	health	insurance,	decided	to	investigate	their	eligibility	and	eventually	enroll	in	Medicaid,	even	if	their	state	did	not	expand.			One	explanation	as	to	why	the	uninsured	rate	would	decrease	and	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	increase	even	more	in	states	that	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	than	in	those	that	do	not	is	because	the	Medicaid	expansion	expands	coverage	to	all	those	with	incomes	below	138	percent	of	the	FPL.	Before	the	expansion,	Medicaid	only	covered	low-income	children,	elderly	individuals,	pregnant	women,	disabled	individuals,	and	some	parents,	but	coverage	did	not	include	some	categories	of	adults,	such	as	childless	adults.		Furthermore,	state	Medicaid	thresholds	usually	did	not	extend	as	far	up	as	138	percent	of	the	
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poverty	line	(Wachino,	Artiga,	and	Rudowitz	2014).		By	extending	coverage	to	incomes	below	138	percent	of	the	FPL	and	several	new	categories	of	adults,	such	as	childless	adults,	it	is	only	inevitable	that	the	uninsured	rate	will	decrease	and	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	will	increase	in	states	that	enact	the	expansion	more	than	in	those	that	do	not.		In	other	words,	expanding	Medicaid	allows	for	a	greater	group	of	individuals	to	be	covered,	which	is	why	the	uninsured	rate	decreases	and	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	increases.		The	Medicaid	expansion	also	makes	it	easier	for	people	to	enroll	in	Medicaid,	as	the	ACA	mandates	that	all	states	must	allow	for	individuals	to	enroll	in	the	program	by	phone,	email,	or	online,	options	that	were	not	necessarily	available	in	all	states	before	the	expansion	(Wachino,	Artiga,	and	Rudowitz	2014).		If	individuals	are	more	easily	able	to	enroll	in	the	program,	it	means	more	people	will	choose	to	enroll,	and	the	uninsured	rate	will	decrease	and	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	will	increase.	I	also	find	that	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	increases	by	0.6	percentage	points	(0.006	is	the	estimated	coefficient	on	the	postt	variable)	in	non-expansion	states	from	pre	to	post-2014.		This	result	makes	sense,	as	the	proportion	of	people	who	are	covered	through	a	direct	purchase	could	have	increased	because	of	other	aspects	of	the	ACA,	such	as	the	fact	that	each	state	had	to	establish	some	type	of	exchange	where	individuals	could	purchase	insurance.		Having	these	newly	established	exchanges	post-2014	likely	made	it	easier	for	individuals	to	directly	purchase	insurance	from	providers,	therefore	increasing	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	
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direct	purchase.		Although	the	estimated	coefficient	on	my	postt	variable	is	positive,	the	estimated	coefficient	on	the	postt*MedicaidExpansionNews	variable	is	-0.008.		This	coefficient	is	negative	with	a	bigger	magnitude	than	the	postt	variable	is	positive,	which	means	that	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	actually	decreases	by	0.1	percentage	points	in	expansion	states	from	pre	to	post-2014.		Although	a	decrease	of	0.1	percentage	points	in	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	in	expansion	states	is	not	significant	(p-value	=	0.588),	this	result	does	show	that	some	individuals	who	were	getting	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	before	the	expansion	switched	to	obtaining	their	insurance	through	Medicaid	once	the	expansion	was	enacted.		Many	of	these	individuals	were	likely	ones	that	did	not	qualify	for	Medicaid	before	the	expansion,	but	did	qualify	for	it	under	the	expansion,	causing	their	demand	to	obtain	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	to	decrease,	while	increasing	their	demand	for	obtaining	insurance	through	Medicaid.		This	result	is	also	consistent	with	my	other	result	that	Medicaid	coverage	increases	more	than	the	uninsured	rate	decreases.			 Although	I	do	not	find	that	implementing	the	Medicaid	expansion	has	a	significant	additional	effect	on	the	change	in	the	average	monthly	family	premium	per	enrolled	employee	for	employer-based	health	insurance,	I	do	find	that	the	estimated	coefficient	on	the	postt	variable	is	significant	when	the	dependent	variable	is	this	health	insurance	outcome.		I	find	that	the	average	monthly	family	premium	per	enrolled	employee	for	employer-based	health	insurance	increases	by	81.40	dollars	from	pre	to	post-2014.		This	result	is	highly	significant	with	a	p-value	
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of	0.000.		Although	I	do	not	find	this	estimated	coefficient	on	my	postt*MedicaidExpansionNews	variable	to	be	significant	when	monthly	average	premium	per	enrolled	employee	for	employer-based	health	insurance	is	my	dependent	variable,	the	standard	error	on	this	estimated	coefficient	is	economically	significant	at	16.17	dollars.		As	previously	described,	I	cannot	determine	the	exact	effect	a	Medicaid	expansion	actually	has	on	this	price	simply	because	I	have	a	small	amount	of	data.		I	can	be	95	percent	confident,	however,	that	the	effect	falls	between	-10.92	and	53.76	dollars.	In	both	of	my	OLS	regressions,	I	find	that	the	estimated	coefficient	on	the	MedicaidExpansionst	variable	is	not	significant,	which	means	that	implementing	a	Medicaid	expansion	does	not	significantly	change	monthly	silver	and	bronze	premium	prices	when	controlling	for	all	of	the	variables	in	vector	Zst.		The	estimated	coefficients	on	MedicaidExpansionst	are	presented	in	table	12	below.		
Table	12.	Medicaid	Expansion	Implementation	and	Metal-tier	Premium	Prices		
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLE	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	Monthly	Silver	Premium		 Monthly	Bronze	Premium		MedicaidExpansionst	 	-14.87	(21.40)		
	-7.01	(18.65)	R2		 0.283	 0.239	Sample	Size		 100	 100	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.					
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In	expansion	states,	people	with	low	incomes	are	covered	by	Medicaid,	which	means	that	people	purchasing	insurance	through	exchanges	and	insurance	providers	are	likely	higher-income	people	who	are	more	likely	to	be	healthier	because	they	have	an	easier	time	affording	health	insurance	when	they	are	ill.		If	the	group	of	people	purchasing	insurance	through	providers	in	expansion	states	becomes	primarily	high-income	people	who	are	generally	healthier	after	the	expansion,	providers	can	lower	their	premiums	(meaning	that	the	estimated	coefficients	on	the	premium	prices	will	be	negative)	because	these	high-income	people	demanding	insurance	will	need	fewer	health	services.		Because	my	estimated	coefficients	are	not	significant,	I	cannot	conclude	whether	or	not	this	hypothesis	is	in	fact	true.		One	reason	I	might	not	be	seeing	significant	results	is	simply	because	my	sample	size	only	contains	two	years,	meaning	that	it	is	too	small	to	yield	any	significant	results.		When	my	implementation	variables	are	FederallyFacilitatedNews	and	StateBasedNews,	looking	at	the	estimated	coefficients	on	postt	variables	presented	in	table	13	allow	me	to	conclude	the	following	results.		First,	from	before	to	after	2014,	the	uninsured	rate	decreases	by	2.0	percentage	points	in	a	state	that	does	not	implement	a	federally-facilitated	or	state-based	exchange,	but	rather	implements	a	partnership	exchange.		This	result	is	significant,	yielding	a	p-value	of	0.011.		I	also	find	that	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	Medicaid	increases	by	3.5	percentage	points	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	a	state	that	implements	a	partnership	exchange,	this	result	being	highly	significant	with	a	p-value	of	0.002.		Third,	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	their	employer	
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significantly	decreases	by	3.0	percentage	points	from	before	to	after	2014	in	a	state	that	implements	a	partnership	exchange	(p-value	=	0.000).			The	coefficients	on	my	post*FederallyFacilitatedNews	variable	when	my	health	insurance	outcomes	are	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	and	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	a	direct	purchase	are	both	significant;	however,	each	of	these	coefficients	has	an	opposite	sign	from	the	postt	coefficient	in	the	same	regression.		For	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	Medicaid,	the	coefficient	on	postt	is	0.035	and	the	coefficient	on	post*FederallyFacilitatedNews	is	-0.017.		Adding	these	two	coefficients	together,	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	Medicaid	in	a	state	that	implements	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	instead	of	a	partnership	one	actually	additionally	increases	by	1.8	percentage	points	and	this	result	is	significant	with	a	p-value	0.008.		The	sum	of	the	coefficients	on	postt	and	post*FederallyFacilitatedNews	is	not	significant,	meaning	that	implementing	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	instead	of	a	partnership	one	does	not	significantly	additionally	change	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	from	pre	to	post-2014.		None	of	the	estimated	coefficients	on	the	postt*StateBasedNews	variable	are	significant	in	any	of	these	regressions.		This	means	that	implementing	a	state-based	exchange	instead	of	a	partnership	one	does	not	significantly	additionally	change	the	uninsured	rate,	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid,	or	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	their	employer	from	pre	to	post-2014.	The	significant	results	described	above	could	be	attributed	to	a	variety	of	explanations,	one	being	the	Medicaid	expansion.		The	Medicaid	expansion	increases	
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the	number	of	individuals	eligible	for	Medicaid.		Some	of	these	newly-eligible	individuals	might	not	have	had	insurance	before	the	expansion	because	they	could	not	afford	it.		The	expansion	provides	them	with	an	affordable	way	to	obtain	insurance	and	therefore	decreases	the	overall	uninsured	rate	and	also	increases	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	Medicaid.		Moreover,	the	Medicaid	expansion	expands	Medicaid	coverage	to	more	people,	demand	for	insurance	through	other	sources,	such	as	an	employer,	decreases.				
Table	13.	Exchange	Implementation	and	Health	Insurance	Outcomes		
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	Proportion	Uninsured	 Proportion	Medicaid	 Proportion	Employer	 Proportion	Direct	Purchase	 Monthly	Avg.	Family	Premium		FederallyFacilitatedNews		 	0.014*	(0.0084)		
	-0.019**	(0.0089)	 	-0.009	(0.0108)	 	0.003	(0.0057)	 	14.76	(32.59)	StateBasedNews		 -0.006	(0.0114)		 -0.005	(0.0109)	 -0.004	(0.0125)	 0.016**	(0.0061)	 48.00	(37.71)	Postt			 -0.020**	(0.0077)	 0.035***	(0.0106)	 -0.030***	(0.0067)	 -0.003	(0.0047)	 105.18***	(21.66)	Postt	*FederallyFacilitatedNews			
0.008	(0.0061)	 -0.017*	(0.0089)	 0.004	(0.0041)	 0.007*	(0.0036)	 -24.50	(21.40)	
Postt*StateBasedNews	 -0.006	(0.0077)			
0.014	(0.0099)	 -0.001	(0.0041)	 -0.002	(0.0040)	 6.98	(23.59)	
R2	 0.671	 0.421	 0.775	 0.542	 0.605		Sample	Size	 300	 300	 300	 300	 150		
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.					
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I	also	find	a	significant	result	when	my	health	insurance	outcome	is	the	average	monthly	family	premium	per	enrolled	employee	for	employer-based	health			
	Table	14.	Exchange	Implementation	and	Metal-tier	Premium	Prices	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLE	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES		 Monthly	Silver	Premium	 Monthly	Bronze	Premium		FederallyFacilitatedst	 	21.99	(20.42)		
	11.93	(19.61)	StateBasedst			 -18.44	(26.01)	 -27.84	(22.52)	R2		 0.317	 0.291	Sample	Size		 100	 100	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.					insurance.		First,	in	interpreting	the	estimated	coefficient	on	the	postt	variable,	I	can	conclude	that	the	average	monthly	family	premium	per	enrolled	employee	for	employer-based	health	insurance	increases	by	105.18	dollars	from	before	to	after	2014	in	a	state	that	implements	a	partnership	exchange.		This	result	is	significant	with	a	p-value	of	0.000.		Neither	the	estimated	coefficient	on	the	postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	nor	the	estimated	coefficient	on	the	postt*StateBasedNews	variable	is	significant	in	this	regression,	which	means	that	implementing	a	federally-facilitated	or	state-based	exchange	instead	of	a	partnership	one	does	not	additionally	change	the	average	monthly	family	premium	from	pre	to	post-2014.		It	is	worth	noting,	however,	that	the	standard	errors	of	the	
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estimated	coefficients	on	the	postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	and	postt*StateBasedNews	variables	are	both	quite	large	and	economically	significant	at	21.40	and	23.59	dollars,	respectively.		As	previously	described,	although	I	cannot	determine	the	exact	effect	of	either	type	of	exchange,	having	such	large	standard	deviations	means	there	could	potentially	be	negative	effects,	zero	effects,	or	positive	effects.		Finally,	as	summarized	in	table	14,	I	do	not	find	any	significant	results	when	my	health	insurance	outcomes	are	the	metal-tier	premium	prices.		
	 When	all	three	implementation	variables	are	included	in	one	regression,	the	only	significant	coefficients	that	I	find	are	on	the	postt*MedicaidExpansionNews	variable,	as	shown	in	table	15	below.		I	do	not	find	any	significant	estimated	coefficients	on	either	the	postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	or	postt*StateBasedNews	variables	in	any	of	my	regressions.		When	the	health	insurance	outcome	is	the	uninsured	rate,	I	find	that	implementing	a	Medicaid	expansion	additionally	decreases	the	uninsured	rate	by	0.7	percentage	points.		This	result	is	moderately	significant	with	a	0.054	p-value.		I	also	find	that	implementing	a	Medicaid	expansion	increases	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	by	1.9	percentage	points,	this	result	being	highly	significant	with	a	p-value	of	0.000.		Recalling	my	previous	results,	when	the	health	insurance	outcome	was	proportion	covered	through	Medicaid	and	only	FederallyFacilitatedNews	and	StateBasedNews	were	included	as	implementation	variables,	there	was	a	significant	estimated	coefficient	on	the	postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	variable.		Because	I	do	not	find	any	significant	coefficients	on	my	postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	or	postt*StateBasedNews	variables	in	this	new	regression	with	all	three	implementation	variables,	I	can	
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conclude	that	once	I	control	for	Medicaid	expansion	implementation,	implementing	a	federally-facilitated	or	state-based	exchange	instead	of	a	partnership	one	does	not	significantly	additionally	affect	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	any	of	my	health	insurance	outcomes.		The	estimated	coefficient	on	postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	in	my	regression	with	only	the	FederallyFacilitatedNews	and	StateExchangeNews	was		
Table	15.	Medicaid	Expansion	Implementation,	Exchange	Implementation,	
and	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	
	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	Proportion	Uninsured	 Proportion	Medicaid	 Proportion	Employer	 Proportion	Direct	Purchase	 Monthly	Avg.	Family	Premium		MedicaidExpansionNews	 	-0.025***	(0.0076)	 	0.020	(0.0155)	 	0.013	(0.0110)	 	-0.002	(0.0083)	 	-3.20	(26.68)		FederallyFacilitatedNews		 	0.000	(0.0085)		
	-0.008	(0.0139)	 	-0.001	(0.0122)	 	0.002	(0.0080)	 	13.22	(31.20)	StateBasedNews		 -0.005	(0.0104)		 -0.006	(0.0101)	 -0.005	(0.0125)	 0.016**	(0.0061)	 47.99	(39.15)	Postt			 -0.012	(0.0075)	 0.017	(0.0111)	 -0.027***	(0.0067)	 -0.000	(0.0073)	 107.31**	(24.91)	Postt	*MedicaidExpansionNews	 -0.007*	(0.0036)		 0.019***	(0.0032)	 -0.006	(0.0043)	 -0.003	(0.0043)	 2.24	(18.16)	Postt	*FederallyFacilitatedNews			
0.001	(0.0063)	 -0.003	(0.0082)	 0.001	(0.0045)	 0.004	(0.0054)	 -26.27	(21.25)	
Postt*StateBasedNews	 -0.009	(0.0079)			
0.016	(0.0095)	 -0.001	(0.0053)	 -0.002	(0.0038)	 6.74	(24.87)	
R2	 0.718	 0.479	 0.779	 0.544	 0.605		Sample	Size	 300	 300	 300	 300	 150		
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.			
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likely	significant	because	the	results	were	correlated	with	the	Medicaid	expansion.		I	also	do	not	find	any	significant	results	when	my	health	insurance	outcomes	are	the	metal-tier	premium	prices,	as	shown	in	table	16	below.	
	
Table	16.	Medicaid	Expansion	Implementation,	Exchange	Implementation	and	
Metal-tier	Premium	Prices	
	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLE	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES		 Monthly	Silver	Premium	 Monthly	Bronze	Premium		MedicaidExpansionst	 	2.96	(28.21)	 	9.98	(22.36)		FederallyFacilitatedst	 	23.78	(27.29)		
	17.96	(22.79)	StateBasedst			 -18.24	(25.77)	 -27.20	(22.30)	R2		 0.317	 0.295	Sample	Size		 100	 100	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.			
	
	
V.	D.	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(With	Implementation)	For	my	final	group	of	regressions	that	examine	how	partisanship	affects	health	insurance	outcomes,	using	implementation	as	a	mediator	variable,	I	find	that	adding	the	MedicaidExpansionNews	as	the	implementation	variable	in	my	regressions	does	not	drastically	affect	any	of	my	previous	results.		The	first	change	I	see	is	that	in	my	regression	where	the	health	insurance	outcome	is	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase,	the	partisanship	variable	
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is	DemocratLegislaturest,	and	the	implementation	variable	is	MedicaidExpansionNewst,	the	coefficient	on	postt	is	now	significant,	whereas	it	was	not	in	my	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(Without	Implementation)	regressions.		The	other	change	I	see	is	that	for	in	my	regressions	where	the	health	insurance	outcome	is	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	an	employer,	the	implementation	variable	is	MedicaidExpansionNewst,	and	partisanship	is	either	DemocratGovernorst	or	DemocratLegislaturest,	the	coefficient	on	Postt*MedicaidExpansionNews	is	no	longer	significant,	whereas	it	was	in	my	Implementation	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	regressions.		The	results	for	the	regressions	where	the	implementation	variable	is	MedicaidExpansionNews	and	the	partisanship	variable	is	DemocratGovernorst	are	summarized	in	table	17	below	and	the	results	for	the	regressions	where	the	implementation	variable	is	MedicaidExpansionNews	and	the	partisanship	variable	is	DemocratLegislaturest	are	summarized	in	table	18	below.		As	shown	in	tables	17	and	18	I	do	not	find	significant	estimated	coefficients	on	either	my	postt*DemocratGovernorst	or	postt*DemocratLegislaturest	variables	in	any	of	my	regressions	where	MedicaidExpansionNews,	is	my	implementation	variable.		This	allows	me	to	conclude	that	when	I	control	for	the	indirect	effect	partisanship	has	on	health	insurance	outcomes	through	Medicaid	expansion	implementation,	having	a	Democrat	governor	or	a	Democrat	legislature	does	not	directly	additionally	affect	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	any	of	my	health	insurance	outcomes.		Furthermore,	because	I	control	for	Medicaid	expansion	implementation	and	find	that	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	health	insurance	outcomes	are	not	coming	
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directly	from	partisanship,	it	means	the	changes	in	the	health	insurance	outcomes	must	be	coming	through	some	other	source.		One	example	of	another	source	that	these	changes	could	be	coming	from	would	be	exchange	implementation.		For	example,	I	am	likely	seeing	a	significant	pre	to	post-2014	increase	in	the	proportion		
Table	17.	Executive	Partisanship,	Medicaid	Expansion	Implementation,	and	
Health	Insurance	Outcomes	
	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLES	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	Proportion	Uninsured	 Proportion	Medicaid	 Proportion	Employer	 Proportion	Direct	Purchase	 Avg.	Monthly	Family	Premium		MedicaidExpansionNews	 	-0.023***	(0.0076)		
	0.018	(0.0108)	 	0.013	(0.0086)	 	0.002	(0.0070)	 	-45.47*	(23.64)	DemocratGovernorst	 -0.008	(0.0070)		 0.011	(0.0080)	 -0.002	(0.0064)	 0.001	(0.0044)	 35.11	(25.77)	Postt	 -0.013***	(0.0043)		 0.016**	(0.0069)	 -0.026***	(0.0053)	 0.0056	(0.0038)	 81.12***	(13.80)	Postt*MedicaidExpansionNews	 -0.013**	(0.0052)		 0.032***	(0.0054)	 -0.006	(0.0044)	 -0.009***	(0.0032)	 30.51	(18.26)	Postt*DemocratGovernorst	 0.001	(0.0073)		 -0.005	(0.0078)	 -0.001	(0.0064)	 0.002	(0.0042)	 -8.52	(18.94)	R2	 0.719		 0.477	 0.779	 0.516	 0.599	Sample	Size	 300		 300	 300	 300	 150	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.					 	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase	and	a	significant		decrease	in	the	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	their	employer	because	exchanges	make	it	easier	for	individuals	to	obtain	their	insurance	
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through	a	direct	purchase.		When	demand	for	insurance	through	an	exchange	increases,	demand	for	insurance	through	other	sources,	such	as	employers,	decreases.		No	matter	what	is	causing	the	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	health	insurance	outcomes,	however,	I	can	certainly	be	sure	that	it	is	not	directly	partisanship.			
Table	18.	Legislative	Partisanship,	Medicaid	Expansion	Implementation,	and	
Health	Insurance	Outcomes	
	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLE	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	Proportion	Uninsured	 Proportion	Medicaid	 Proportion	Employer	 Proportion	Direct	Purchase	 Avg.	Monthly	Family	Premium		MedicaidExpansionNews	 	-0.021***	(0.0067)		
	0.010*	(0.0104)	 	0.015	(0.0101)	 	0.005	(0.0072)	 	-62.24**	(24.94)	DemocratLegislaturest	 -0.010*	(0.0056)		 0.023**	(0.0103)	 -0.006	(0.0078)	 -0.005	(0.0063)	 48.88		(33.51)	Postt	 -0.012**	(0.0067)		 0.014*	(0.0074)	 -0.026***	(0.0056)	 0.006*	(0.0041)	 78.30***	(14.30)	Postt*MedicaidExpansionNews	 -0.016***	(0.0051)		 0.032***	(0.0067)	 -0.007	(0.0051)	 -0.006*	(0.0035)	 56.29	(26.32)	Postt*DemocratLegislaturest	 0.006	(0.0054)		 -0.003	(0.0074)	 0.001	(0.0072)	 -0.003	(0.0063)	 -47.66	(30.77)	R2	 0.717		 0.495	 0.779	 0.499	 0.592	Sample	Size	 294		 294	 294	 294	 147	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.					 One	other	important	note	about	these	results	is	that,	similar	to	in	past	results	sections,	when	my	health	insurance	outcome	is	the	average	monthly	family	
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premium,	the	standard	errors	of	the	estimated	coefficients	on	both	my	postt*DemocratGovernorst	variable	and	postt*DemocratLegislaturest	variable	are	quite	high	and	economically	significant	at	18.94	and	30.77	dollars,	respectively.		Although	I	cannot	determine	the	exact	effect	a	Democrat	governor	or	Democrat	legislature	because	of	limited	data,	I	can	be	95	percent	confident	it	falls	within	-46.40	and	29.36	dollars	when	the	partisanship	variable	is	DemocratGovernorst	and	-109.20	and	13.88	dollars	when	the	partisanship	variable	is	DemocratLegislaturest.	Moving	onto	my	regressions	where	the	implementation	variables	are	FederallyFaciliatedNews	and	StateBasedNews,	I	again	find	that	adding	FederallyFaciliatedNews	and	StateBasedNews	to	my	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	regressions	does	not	radically	change	any	of	my	previous	results.		I	first	see	changes	in	the	estimated	coefficients	on	my	postt	variables	when	the	health	insurance	outcome	is	proportion	covered	through	a	direct	purchase	for	both	the	regression	where	my	partisanship	variable	is	DemocratGovernorst	and	the	regression	where	my	partisanship	variable	is	DemocratLegislaturest		In	my	Partisanship	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	(Without	Implementation)	the	coefficients	on	postt	for	each	of	these	regressions	was	positive,	whereas	it	is	now	negative.		I	also	find	that	there	are	some	slight	differences	on	some	of	the	coefficients	for	the	postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	and	postt*StateBasedNews	variables.		In	the	regression	where	partisanship	is	DemocratGovernorst,	and	the	health	insurance	outcome	is	the	average	monthly	family	premium,	the	estimated	coefficient	on	postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	is	significant,	whereas	it	was	not	in	my	Implementation	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	regressions.		Similarly,	when	the		
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Table	19.	Executive	Partisanship,	State	Exchange	Implementation,	and	Health	
Insurance	Outcomes		
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLE	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	Proportion	Uninsured	 Proportion	Medicaid	 Proportion	Employer	 Proportion	Direct	Purchase	 Avg.	Monthly	Family	Premium		FederallyFacilitatedNews	 	0.007	(0.0094)		
	-0.011	(0.0113)	 	-0.009	(0.0107)	 	0.003	(0.0065)	 	48.82*	(27.23)	StateBasedNews	 -0.008	(0.0110)		 -0.003	(0.0102)	 -0.004	(0.0127)	 0.016***	(0.0059)	 -44.42	(33.60)	DemocratGovernorst	 -0.012	(0.0082)		 0.013	(0.0094)	 -0.000	(0.0069)	 0.000	(0.0045)	 54.39*	(25.70)	Postt	 -0.024***	(0.0079)		 0.041***	(0.0114)	 -0.029***	(0.0077)	 -0.005	(0.0053)	 132.29***	(25.65)	Postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	 0.011	(0.0072)		 -0.022**	(0.0094)	 0.003	(0.0049)	 0.008**	(0.0039)	 -49.38**	(24.59)	Postt*StateBasedNews	 -0.004	(0.0080)		 0.013	(0.0110)	 -0.000	(0.0049)	 -0.003	(0.0044)	 6.97	(23.88)	Postt*DemocratGovernorst	 0.002	(0.0075)		 -0.006	(0.0090)	 -0.002	(0.0059)	 0.003	(0.0044)	 -29.31	(20.58)	R2	 0.682		 0.434	 0.775	 0.543	 0.620	Sample	Size	 300		 300	 300	 300	 150	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.					partisanship	variable	is	DemocratLegislaturest,	and	the	health	insurance	outcomes	are	proportion	uninsured	and	proportion	of	people	who	get	their	insurance	through	a	direct	purchase,	the	estimated	coefficient	on	the	postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	variables	are	significant	and	not	significant,	respectively.		In	my	Implementation	à	Health	Insurance	Outcomes	regressions,	the	estimated	coefficients	on	these	
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variables	were	not	significant	and	significant,	respectively.		The	results	for	the	regressions	where	the	implementation	variables	are	FederallyFacilitatedNews	and	StateBasedNews	and	the	partisanship	variable	is	DemocratGovernorst	are	summarized	in	table	19	above	and	the	results	for	the	regressions	where	the	implementation	variables	is	FederallyFacilitatedNews	and	StateBasedNews	and	the	partisanship	variable	is	DemocratLegislaturest	are	summarized	in	table	20	below.	My	results	do	not	yield	significant	estimated	coefficients	on	the	postt*DemocratGovernorst	or	the	postt*DemocratLegislaturest	variables	for	any	of	my	health	insurance	outcomes.		This	allows	me	to	conclude	that	once	partisanship’s	indirect	effect	through	federally-facilitated	or	state-exchange	implementation	is	controlled	for,	partisanship	does	not	additionally	directly	affect	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	any	of	my	health	insurance	outcomes.		Pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	health	insurance	outcomes	are	coming	from	other	sources.		One	such	source	perhaps	could	be	the	through	advertisement	of	the	ACA.		When	the	ACA	was	first	implemented,	it	received	a	great	deal	of	press	and,	especially	in	states	that	supported	it,	a	lot	of	advertisement.		Advertisement	and	press	relating	to	the	ACA	could	increase	the	public’s	general	knowledge	about	some	of	the	law’s	provisions,	such	as	the	individual	mandate.		If	people	realize	that	they	need	to	be	insured	in	order	to	prevent	receiving	a	tax	penalty,	they	will	seek	out	ways	to	obtain	insurance	either	through	Medicaid,	a	direct	purchase	on	the	exchange,	or	through	an	employer,	which	could	change	pre	to	post-2014	health	insurance	outcomes,	for	example,	in	this	case	decrease	the	overall	uninsured	rate.			
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Table	20.	Legislative	Partisanship,	State	Exchange	Implementation,	and	Health	
Insurance	Outcomes	
	
INDEPENDENT	
VARIABLE	
HEALTH	INSURANCE	OUTCOMES	Proportion	Uninsured	 Proportion	Medicaid	 Proportion	Employer	 Proportion	Direct	Purchase	 Avg.	Monthly	Family	Premium		FederallyFacilitatedNews	 	0.005	(0.0090)		
	-0.005	(0.0128)	 	-0.009	(0.0116)	 	0.000	(0.0066)	 	33.57		(27.51)	StateBasedNews	 -0.008	(0.0115)		 -0.001	(0.0105)	 -0.004	(0.0127)	 0.015**	(0.0148)	 -66.33*	(66.33)	DemocratLegislaturest	 -0.017**	(0.0078)		 0.027**	(0.0128)	 -0.001	(0.0074)	 -0.005	(0.0056)	 53.60*	(30.46)	Postt	 -0.026***	(0.0091)		 0.039***	(0.0130)	 -0.030***	(0.0073)	 -0.002	(0.0058)	 125.35***	(25.69)	Postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews	 0.013*	(0.0072)		 -0.023**	(0.0110)	 0.004	(0.0043)	 0.007	(0.0044)	 -42.81	(25.76)	Postt*StateBasedNews	 -0.004	(0.0089)		 0.008	(0.0123)	 -0.000	(0.0049)	 -0.000	(0.0045)	 30.23	(31.48)	Postt*DemocratLegislaturest	 0.006	(0.0045)		 0.001	(0.0077)	 -0.001	(0.0056)	 -0.003	(0.0039)	 -53.94	(30.10)	R2	 0.687		 0.474	 0.774	 0.529	 0.610	Sample	Size	 294		 294	 294	 294	 147	
Notes:	This	table	presents	the	estimated	coefficients	for	each	variable	with	standard	errors	in	parentheses.		***	Significant	at	the	one	percent	level.	**	Significant	at	the	5	percent	level.	*	Significant	at	the	10	percent	level.		Control	variable	results	available	upon	request	from	the	author.					
VI.	Conclusion		 The	motivating	question	I	ask	at	the	beginning	of	this	study	is	how	much	does	economic	policy	differ	when	Republicans	are	in	power	versus	when	Democrats	are?		Furthermore,	how	do	these	possible	differing	policies	affect	economic	outcomes?		Using	the	ACA	as	my	economic	policy,	I	narrow	this	motivating	question	
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even	further	and	ask,	how	does	the	executive	and	legislative	partisanship	of	a	state	affect	how	the	state	implements	the	Medicaid	expansion	and	state	exchange	components	of	the	law	and,	as	a	result,	constituents’	access	to	health	insurance?		To	answer	my	question,	I	complete	a	mediation	analysis	using	state-level	annual	data	from	2010	to	2015.		The	central	question	I	ask	in	my	mediation	analysis	is	does	state	partisanship	affect	health	insurance	outcomes?			On	one	hand,	I	find	that	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	the	following	health	insurance	outcomes	are	not	significantly	different	in	states	that	have	Democrat	governors	compared	to	ones	that	have	Republican	or	Independent	governors:	proportion	uninsured,	proportion	of	people	covered	through	an	employer,	proportion	of	people	covered	through	a	direct	purchase,	average	monthly	family	premium	for	employee	for	employer-based	health	insurance,	and	the	monthly	silver	and	bronze	premiums	for	a	40	year-old	non-smoker	making	$30,000	per	year	before	tax	credits.		The	same	result	is	true	for	states	that	have	Democrat	legislatures	compared	to	states	that	have	Republican	or	split	ones.		On	the	other	hand,	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	do	significantly	differ	in	states	that	have	Democrat	legislatures	compared	to	in	states	that	have	Republican	or	split	ones.		I	find	that	having	a	Democrat	legislature	increases	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	by	1.7	percentage	points	from	pre	to	post-2014.				 Even	though	I	only	find	that	partisanship	has	an	effect	on	the	pre	to	post-2014	change	in	one	health	insurance	outcome,	I	cannot	prematurely	conclude	that	partisanship	does	not	affect	health	insurance	outcomes	at	all.		I	hypothesize	that	
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partisanship	affects	ACA	implementation,	and	that	ACA	implementation	has	an	effect	on	health	insurance	outcomes,	which	means	that	partisanship	could	indirectly	be	affecting	health	insurance	outcomes	through	implementation.		To	examine	this	possible	indirect	effect	more	in	depth,	the	next	part	of	my	mediation	analysis	involves	examining	how	partisanship	affects	ACA	implementation.		In	this	part	of	my	mediation	analysis,	I	find	that	having	a	Democrat	governor	increases	the	probability	of	a	Medicaid	expansion	by	19.9	percentage	points,	the	probability	of	a	state-based	exchange	by	11.9	percentage	points,	and	the	probability	of	a	partnership	exchange	by	14.0	percentage	points.		Having	a	Democrat	governor	decreases	the	probability	of	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	by	25.9	percentage	points.		Moreover,	having	a	Democrat	legislature	increases	the	probability	of	a	Medicaid	expansion	by	51.6	percentage	points,	the	probability	of	a	state-based	exchange	by	18.7	percentage	points,	and	the	probability	of	a	partnership	exchange	by	15.6	percentage	points.		Having	a	Democrat	legislature	decreases	the	probability	of	a	federally-facilitated	exchange	by	34.4	percentage	points.		 I	then	move	on	to	examine	how	implementation	of	the	two	components	of	the	ACA	affects	health	insurance	outcomes.		The	pre	to	post-2014	change	in	the	uninsured	rate	was	1.2	percentage	points	higher	in	states	that	implemented	the	Medicaid	expansion	compared	to	those	that	did	not.		I	also	find	that	the	proportion	of	people	covered	through	Medicaid	and	the	average	monthly	family	premium	per	employee	for	employer-based	health	insurance	increased	by	1.5	percentage	points	and	1008.12	dollars,	respectively,	from	pre	to	post-2014	in	non-expansion	states.		Implementing	a	Medicaid	expansion	additionally	increased	the	proportion	of	people	
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covered	through	Medicaid	by	2.9	percentage	points.		The	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	each	of	my	health	insurance	outcomes	were	not	significantly	different	when	a	federally-facilitated	or	state-based	exchange	was	implemented	instead	of	a	partnership	one.			 To	complete	my	mediation	analysis,	I	re-run	the	exact	same	regressions	I	ran	when	examining	how	partisanship	affects	health	insurance	outcomes,	but	this	time	use	implementation	of	the	two	components	of	the	ACA	as	a	mediator	variables.		Doing	this	allows	me	to	look	at	how	implementation	choices	mediate	the	relationship	between	partisanship	and	health	insurance	outcomes.		When	the	mediator	variable	is	Medicaid	expansion	implementation,	I	find	that	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	each	of	my	health	insurance	outcomes	are	not	significantly	different	in	states	that	had	a	Democrat	governor	compared	to	states	that	had	Republican	or	Independent	ones.		I	find	the	same	results	to	be	true	when	examining	legislative	partisanship.		I	also	find	the	same	results	when	the	mediator	variables	are	a	federally-facilitated	and	state-based	exchange.		In	other	words,	controlling	for	implementation,	pre	to	post-2014	changes	in	health	insurance	outcomes	are	not	significantly	different	in	states	that	have	a	Democrat	governor	or	legislature	compared	to	states	that	do	not.		From	these	results,	I	can	conclude	that	partisanship	only	has	an	indirect	effect	through	implementation	on	health	insurance	outcomes.		This	indirect	effect	can	be	separated	into	two	parts.		First,	partisanship	affects	whether	or	not	the	state	expands	Medicaid	and	which	type	of	exchange	the	state	implements.		Second,	implementation	then	affects	some	health	insurance	outcomes,	
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as	described	above,	which	means	that	partisanship	is	essentially	affecting	health	insurance	outcomes	through	implementation	decisions.				 In	conclusion,	economic	policy	does	differ	when	Republicans	are	in	power	versus	when	Democrats	are;	however	such	differing	policies	do	not	always	lead	to	different	economic	outcomes	under	each	party.		During	the	time	in	which	this	research	was	in	progress,	the	partisanship	of	the	president	changed,	leaving	the	ACA’s	future	status	uncertain.		Because	of	this,	it	is	hard	to	attribute	my	findings	to	any	future	ACA	policies;	however,	my	findings	do	have	policy	implications	beyond	the	ACA.		First,	when	the	federal	government	enacts	a	law	that	is	a	federal	law,	but	allows	states	to	have	some	control	over	how	they	choose	to	implement	it,	the	federal	government	must	be	aware	that	Republican	and	Democrat	states	will	implement	it	differently,	just	as	they	implemented	the	ACA	differently.		The	federal	government	cannot	assume	that	states	will	enact	the	law	exactly	how	it	prefers,	especially	when	the	state	is	controlled	by	a	different	partisanship	than	the	presidency.		Applying	this	theory	to	other	policies,	in	education	policy,	the	federal	government	sets	national	educational	guidelines	and	provides	federal	funding	to	school	districts	that	follow	such	guidelines.		Each	state,	however,	is	largely	given	control	over	whether	or	not	it	wants	to	follow	these	guidelines,	how	it	wants	to	operate	public	schools,	what	its	curriculum	will	be,	and	graduation	requirements	(Thomson	Reuters	2017).		Although	federal	agencies,	such	as	the	Department	of	Education,	can	recommend	graduation	thresholds	and	curriculum,	there	is	no	way	for	the	federal	government	to	enforce	that	states	will	follow	them.		In	other	words,	similar	to	the	ACA,	the	federal	government	must	be	aware	that	Republican	and	Democrat	states	will	implement	
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education	policy	differently,	with	states	that	are	controlled	by	the	same	partisanship	as	the	presidency	likely	choosing	to	implement	the	federal	guidelines.		Moreover,	states	that	do	and	do	not	implement	the	federal	guidelines	might	experience	differences	in	education	levels,	just	as	states	that	did	and	did	not	implement	the	Medicaid	expansion	experienced	differences	in	health	insurance	outcomes.						
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